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# 11 September: The Plot and the Plotters

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Initiatives

Timeline (A)

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# 11 September: The Plot and the Plotters (C//NF)

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The Plot and the Plotters ■ ■ ■ ■

## 11 September: The Plot and the Plotters (U)

### Scope Note (U)

Our knowledge of the 11 September plot is still increasing and evolving—this paper does not represent all we will ever know about the attacks. Information in this paper is current through May 2003. ~~(C/NF)~~

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(b)(3) CIAAct The judgments in this assessment are drawn from analysis of a variety of sources

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We have included all information we deemed c(b)(3) CIAAct frequently were forced to rely on uncorroborated or single-source r(b)(3) NatSecAct some of the judgments. Detainee debriefings— provided a great deal of information on the activities of the hijackers abroad, as well as details on how the plot came together and who was involved. The information on the activities of the hijackers within the United States (b)(1) the FBI, INS, Customs, and the FAA. (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct

This publication focuses on the events leading to the 11 September attacks and the actual participants in the attacks. Since 11 September 2001, we have identified the 19 individuals who carried out the attacks. Zacarias Moussaoui, who is the subject of a US criminal investigation—and others who may have been involved, have not been included in this publication. ~~(C/NF)~~

Note on our use of names: Because of the length and complexity of Middle Eastern names, we tend to use abbreviated versions of the name of the 19 hijackers throughout this assessment. The fuller and formally correct names are captured in the individual data sheets in appendix B. It is common for individuals with Arabic names to have four or more parts to their name to distinguish between father and son or brothers with similar multiple-name constructs. (U)

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Individuals and places pictured on the front cover: (b)(1)  
*Left side, first photo: Photos of hijackers Hani Hanjour and Majid 'Aw (a.k.a. Majid Muqid)* (b)(3) CIAAct  
*Left side, second photo: Hijacker 'Abd al-Aziz al-Umari.* (b)(3) NatSecAct  
*Left side, third photo: Hijackers from United Airlines flight 175.*  
*Left side, fourth photo: Hijacker Ahmad al-Haznawi as portrayed in a testimonial video.*  
*Left side, fifth photo: Hijacker-pilot Ziad Jarrah*  
*Left side, sixth photo: Photos of hijackers Muhammad Atta and 'Abd al-Aziz al-Umari as they pass through the Portland International (Maine) Jetport.* (b)(1)  
*Mid page, center: Hijacker-pilot Muhammad Atta* (b)(3) CIAAct  
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This research paper was prepared by the DCI Counterterrorist Center's Office of Terrorism Analysis.

Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the

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The Plot and the Players

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**The 11 September 2001 Plot:  
The Evolution of the Attacks (U)**

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### The 11 September 2001 Plot: The Evolution of the Attacks (U)

#### Key Findings (U)

The plot to attack the United States on 11 September 2001 evolved over a period of several years, and its roots go back even further to the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993. An investigation of the 11 September attacks has revealed that one of its chief planners, Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, is not only the uncle of Ramzi Yousef—the mastermind of the 1993 plot—but also provided funds, training, and other support to the conspirators of the bombing in 1993.

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The idea for the attacks reportedly received Usama Bin Ladin's approval in 1998, after which al-Qa'ida leaders began to select the young men who would carry them out.

- Three of the four pilots—Muhammad Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi, and Ziad Jarrah—were apparently recruited for the plot from Germany, where they had come to study from Egypt, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Lebanon. A network of al-Qa'ida associates in Hamburg supported their efforts.
- Two of the hijackers—Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar—had been active in al-Qa'ida circles since the mid-1990s, had fought with other jihadists in three countries, and arrived in the United States well before any of the other hijackers. Khalid left the country after they briefly attempted flight training in the United States in 2000. Nawaf remained in the United States serving as second in command for the plot.
- The fourth pilot—Hani Hanjur—and the remaining hijackers, with the exception of UAE citizen Fayiz Banihammad, were Saudis. They largely appear to have been radicalized by contacts at universities, religious camps, and mosques in the late 1990s and were probably brought into the plot in the latter half of 2000. (S//~~NF~~)

The plot was launched in earnest in late 1999, when the three Hamburg-based pilots traveled to Afghanistan, and al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar coordinated their travel to Malaysia after which they entered the United States. The Hamburg pilots came to the United States in late May and June 2000, spending the rest of the year in flight training in Florida. Hanjur entered the United States in late 2000 and paired up with al-Hazmi in Arizona to continue the flight training he had intermittently pursued in the United States since 1996. The supporting hijackers began entering the United States in late April 2001.

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11 September

Although the 11 September plotters made mistakes and ran into a number of obstacles, they were able to carry out the hijackings because of several factors.

- **Shrewd selection of operatives.** With the exception of al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar, the men sent into the United States were "clean" and had no trouble entering the country. The four pilots also had the advantage of years of experience in Western countries where they became familiar with banking, communication, and travel practices.
- **Relatively safe operating environment.** The planners of the 11 September attacks evidently felt comfortable enough with their assessment of US society—open, mobile, and diverse—that they could leave crucial operatives in place for more than a year without fear of discovery.
- **Flexibility and mission focus.** Conspirators who either failed to qualify as pilots or to enter the United States assumed new roles in the plot, while other operatives were found to fulfill their original roles.
- **Well-coached and coordinated financial operations.** The financial transactions that facilitated the 11 September operation reflected al-Qa'ida's long experience in moving funds unobtrusively. ~~(S//NF)~~

In spite of increased security consciousness and regulations since fall 2001, al-Qa'ida could still duplicate certain aspects of the 11 September plot, given the extreme difficulty of identifying suspicious individuals, financial transactions, or communications in a country and economy as large and diverse as the United States. The hijackers' ability to operate unnoticed inside the United States for more than a year in some cases may even have convinced al-Qa'ida leaders that using operatives to carry out future attacks in the United States, even in an atmosphere of heightened vigilance, is a risk well worth taking. ~~(S//NF)~~

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The Plot and the Execution

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The Plot and the Plotters ■ ■ ■ ■

## The 11 September 2001 Plot: The Evolution of the Attacks (U)

### Development of the 11 September Attacks (U)

#### Early Conceptual Roots

The 11 September attack was a sophisticated plot that was probably in the planning stages for more than two years and carried out by a group of 19 committed individuals as well as an extensive network of largely unwitting supporters and facilitators.

- In an interview for al-Jazirah television aired on 8 September 2002, high-ranking al-Qa'ida member **Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM)** said that the attacks were planned during a three-year period; a study of possible targets began at the same time al-Qa'ida prepared for the US Embassy bombing operation in 1998 in Africa. ~~(S//NF)~~

We believe that a common thread runs between the first attack on the World Trade Center in February 1993 and the attacks on 11 September 2001.

al-Qa'ida operatives in detention have named KSM as either the mastermind or one of the key planners of the 11 September operation. KSM, the uncle of **Ramzi Yousef**, who masterminded the 1993 bombing plot against the World Trade Center, provided financial and logistic support for the 1993 operation.

- Following the 1993 attack, Yousef and KSM plotted in 1995 to blow up 12 US planes flying East Asian routes—for which KSM was indicted in 1996—and to fly a plane into CIA headquarters. Philippine authorities uncovered the plot, and Yousef was later arrested in Pakistan, but KSM escaped. ~~(S//NF)~~

KSM was not the only al-Qa'ida figure to consider destroying commercial aircraft in the mid-1990s. In 1996, **Usama Bin Ladin's** second in command, **Muhammad 'Atif** (a.k.a. Abu Hafs), drew up a study on the feasibility of hijacking US planes and destroying them in flight, possibly influenced by Yousef's and KSM's unrealized plans.

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- That August, Bin Ladin issued a declaration of war against the United States, calling on his supporters to begin a guerrilla campaign that would drive US forces out of the Saudi Arabian peninsula. ~~(S//NF)~~

#### The Plot Takes Shape

As Bin Ladin's determination to strike America home increased in 1998, the ideas about destroying commercial airliners were revived.

KSM proposed to Bin Ladin that small aircraft packed with explosives target the World Trade Center. Bin Ladin suggested using even larger planes, saying, "an axe if you can use a bulldozer?"

- In an interview for al-Jazirah television, KSM said that he had come up with the proposal that a "martinidom operation" in the United States should target prominent buildings.

a "reconnaissance team" traveled to the United States during 1998-99 to look at potential targets. The original list reportedly included thirty targets, but al-Qa'ida's leadership and military committee narrowed down the list, leaving other targets for future operations. After this, came the selection of operatives for the attacks.

KSM claimed that al-Qa'ida considered striking "nuclear facilities" but shelved the idea for fear that it could "go out of control."

- According to **Ramzi Bin al-Shibh**, a senior al-Qa'ida official captured in Pakistan on 11 September 2002, three of the 11 September pilots—**Muhammad Atta**, **Marwan al-Shehhi**,

KSM provided a list of several potential targets to Atta, which included such targets as the White House.

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**Figure 1**  
**The Hijackers and Their Flights (U)**

Flight	Name	Target
<b>American Airlines 11</b>	Muhammad Atta 'Abd al-Aziz al-Umari Uthman al-Suqami Wa'il al-Shehri Walid al-Shehri	World Trade Center
<b>United Airlines 175</b>	Marwan al-Shehhi Ahmad al-Ghamdi Hamza al-Ghamdi Fayiz Banihammad Muhannad al-Shehri	World Trade Center
<b>American Airlines 77</b>	Hani Hanjour Nawaf al-Hazmi Salim al-Hazmi Khalid al-Mihdhar Majid Muqid	(b)(1)ntagon (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct
<b>United Airlines 93</b>	Ziad Jarrah Ahmad al-Nami Ahmad al-Haznawi Sa'id al-Ghamdi	Crashed in Pennsylvania

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and Ziad Jarrah—were unable to come to an agreement on whether nuclear targets should be considered because nuclear targets would be very difficult to hit: Airspace around them was typically restricted, making reconnaissance overflights impossible and increasing the possibility that they would be shot down before reaching their target.

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#### Executioners of the Plot (U)

Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar were two of the first hijackers selected by Bin Ladin to be part of the attacks on the United States.

Atif deliberately chose the "second wave" hijackers from among young Arab men who had no previous terrorist activities

that would have brought them to the attention of authorities in the West. The hijackers were also chosen on the basis of nationality so that they would not have trouble obtaining US visas.

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KSM who, on the basis of his own experience in living in the United States, shared insights on how to behave unobtrusively.

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#### Two al-Qa'ida Veterans

Of all the hijackers chosen, Saudis Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar had the most established extremist credentials. They first came into al-Qa'ida orbit as early as the mid-1990s.

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Al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi joined other militants to fight in Bosnia in 1995.

Al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi then traveled to Afghanistan and, by the late 1990s, were committed al-Qa'ida fighters.

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#### The Hamburg Network

Muhammad Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi, and Ziad Jarrah—who would go on to play a pivotal role in the 11 September conspiracy—emerged from a group of young Muslim men in Hamburg, Germany, that had come together by late 1998. Although the members of this group came from different countries and backgrounds, they attended the same mosques, shared common acquaintances, and were drawn together by their increasingly extreme Islamist views and disenchantment with the West.

- Muhammad Atta, an Egyptian who would later serve as the senior coordinator of the plot inside the United States and pilot the first plane into the World Trade Center, arrived in Hamburg in 1992. He enrolled at Hamburg-Harburg Technical University in an architecture-planning program from which he eventually received the German equivalent of a master's degree.

- Hijacker-pilot Marwan al-Shehhi came to Germany from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in April 1996 on a UAE military scholarship. Al-Shehhi moved

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to Hamburg in 1999 and enrolled at the university where Atta studied. ~~(C/NF)~~

Atta and al-Shehhi probably knew each other before that, at least by mid-1998. They shared a common acquaintance with **Mounir Motassadeq**, a Moroccan living in Hamburg convicted of complicity in the plot in February 2003 by German authorities.

- In January 2000, Al-Shehhi moved into the 54 Marianstrasse apartment that Atta and two others had rented in late 1998—a location that appears to be central to the planning of the operation. ~~(S/NF)~~

Ziad Jarrah traveled from his home in Lebanon to Germany to study in 1996, initially attempting to enter medical school in Greifswald. In August, Jarrah moved to Hamburg where he began studies in aircraft construction at Hamburg's School of Applied Sciences.

- He never lived at the 54 Marianstrasse apartment, however, he had begun to associate with key associates of Atta and al-Shehhi by at least the summer of 1998. ~~(S/NF)~~ (b)(3) NatSecAct

Other individuals who would later figure in the 11 September plot were also in Hamburg by the late 1990s. Motassadeq, who helped the hijackers move some of the money needed to finance the plot, arrived in 1995, as did **Sa'id Bahaj** and Ramzi Bin al-Shibh, who became Atta's roommates in November 1998.

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Atta, Bin al-Shibh, Bahaji, and Motassadeq were already at the core of a group that attended the same mosques, including the radical al-Qods mosque, as early as March 1997.

- The individual described Atta as the leader of the group, which reportedly regarded Jews and Americans as "the enemy" and met in small groups to discuss Islamic principles.

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- Atta and Bin al-Shibh also reportedly traveled within Germany to talk to other students about religion and politics. ~~(C/NF)~~

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#### Young Saudis Gravitate Toward al-Qa'ida

Thirteen of the remaining fourteen hijackers chosen came from southwest Saudi Arabia: five from the Asir Province on Saudi Arabia's porous border with Yemen, four from neighboring Al Bahah, and four from the Makkah Province. These young Saudi men, who made up the majority of the 11 September hijackers, were a diverse group: some struggled with depression or alcohol abuse, a few had higher education and others little, and their families came from different parts of the socioeconomic spectrum.

- This group was most likely recruited in local mosques or universities, which several of them attended. Most of them began procuring new passports and US visas during the fall of 2000, suggesting that they were recruited after the first five hijackers. ~~(S/NF)~~

Saudi **Hani Hanjur** is similar to the other young Saudi hijackers in some ways, yet stands out because of his prolonged and frequent presence in the United States before 11 September and his position in the operation as a pilot.

- Against the wishes of his family, in 1991, Hanjur traveled to the United States to study English. He returned to Saudi Arabia four-and-a-half months later. Hanjur returned to the United States in April

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1996 and again in November 1997.

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that al-Shehhi left Hamburg at roughly the same time (b)(1)

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**Exploitation of Afghan Camps (C/NF)**

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(b)(3) NatSecAct **Travel Patterns Lead to Afghanistan**

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all 19 of the hijackers spent time in al-Qa'ida training camps in Afghanistan during late 1999-2001.

• Jarrah's travel at this time mirrored Atta's

November (b)(1)

to Karachi, (b)(3) CIAAct

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the hijackers traveled through one or more other countries before entering Afghanistan to disguise their destination. Several appear to have traveled to Afghanistan more than once and, except for the pilots, were there for visits of several months' duration.

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• Bin al-Shibh was the last of the (b)(1) travel

to Afghanistan. He traveled from (b)(3) CIAAct

to Karachi, Pakistan (b)(3) NatSecAct

• Hijackers Majid Muqid (a.k.a. Majid 'Awfi) and Uthman al-Suqami (a.k.a. Satam al-Suqami) traveled to Afghanistan at least twice.

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When Bin al-Shibh joined Atta and Jarrah at Bin Ladin's military camp near the Kandahar airport, he learned that they had already met with and pledged *bayat* to Bin Ladin.

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(b)(1)ng Saudis

all of them were pre(b)(3) CIAAct

at some point in late 2000 or early (b)(3) NatSecAct

Atta may have traveled to Afghanistan for the first time in early 1998 when he told his roommate he was gone for two months on a pilgrimage.

by the spring of 2001, the mostly Saudi "support" hijackers were training in Afghanistan. They reportedly knew they were training for a martyrdom operation but did not know the details.

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In late 1999, Atta, al-Shehhi, Jarrah, and Bin al-Shibh all traveled to Afghanistan separately.

• Atta flew from Hamburg to Karachi, Pakistan, arriving November. After that, he traveled into Afghanistan. Early during this period, Atta swore an oath of loyalty ("*bayat*") to Bin Ladin, according to Bin al-Shibh.

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the planners of the 11 September attacks screened possible

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participants for their psychological fitness for such an operation.

- According to an al-Jazeera interview, Bin Ladin personally met with and assessed each hijacker.

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#### Crucial Planning Meetings

(b)(1) Since 11 September, we have obtained information  
(b)(3) CIAAct on which al-Qa'ida leaders were involved in  
(b)(3) NatSecAct the attacks during this crucial late-1999  
period in Afghanistan.

Atta met with senior al-Qa'ida leaders in Kandahar, Afghanistan, during Ramadan in December 1999.

(b)(1) Atta reportedly met during this period with  
(b)(3) CIAAct in Ladin more than once and met repeatedly with  
(b)(3) NatSecAct tenants the late 'Atif as  
details of the plot were being worked out.

(b)(1) • Tawfiq Bin Attash (a.k.a. Khallad), a key planner  
(b)(3) CIAAct of the 2000 attack on the USS Cole, was also in  
(b)(3) NatSecAct Kandahar at this time.

- All available information suggests that, following the Ramadan meetings in Afghanistan, Atta had no more direct connections to the al-Qa'ida senior leadership and that information was passed to, and instructions received from them, via intermediaries.

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(b)(1) subsequent meetings, Bin Ladin selected targets for  
(b)(3) CIAAct the September attacks and five candidates for pilot  
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- As a result of the Kandahar meetings, the five designated pilots at that time were Atta, Jarrah, al-Shehhi, Nawaf al-Hazmi, and Bin al-Shibh.

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Bin Ladin that Atta had been chosen as the plot's senior coordinator and that they all would receive additional operational instructions from 'Atif.

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As they left Afghanistan, Atta and Bin al-Shibh

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- In their Karachi meetings, KSM briefed Atta on the habits of Americans and presumably on how to avoid the scrutiny of American authorities, according to Bin al-Shibh.

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#### Preparations for the Mission (U)

##### New Passports Cover Tracks

When they left Afghanistan, the future pilots immediately began to prepare for their mission.

al-Shehhi, Jarrah, and Bin al-Shibh to clean their passports of Pakistani visas before applying for a U visa. Upon their return to Germany, they shaved the beards

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- Al-Shehhi obtained a new passport in the UAE on 2 January 2000, reporting his old one lost, and, on 18 January, received a US visa from the US Consulate in Dubai, UAE.

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- Jarrah returned to Hamburg and reported that his passport had been lost. He received a visa from the US Embassy in Berlin on 25 May.

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• Atta [redacted] to Hamburg [redacted] on [redacted] February. Atta received a new Egyptian passport, [redacted]. He used the name Muhammad Atta on this passport, although on his previous passports, he had used the name Muhammad al-Amir, according to an al-Jazirah interview of KSM. On 18 May, the US Embassy in Berlin issued him a US visa.

• In May 2000, Bin al-Shibh was denied a US visa. In July 2000, during an interview at the US Embassy in Berlin, Bin al-Shibh was told that since he had only been in Germany for two years, he had insufficient connections to assure his departure from the United States. (S/ [redacted] NF) (b)(3) NatSecAct

Upon their return from Afghanistan in 2000, Atta, al-Shehhi, Jarrah, and Bin al-Shibh began looking for flight schools in Europe and learned that European flight schools were very expensive and involved a very long training period. They soon learned that flight schools in the United States were less expensive, of shorter duration, and not terribly rigorous and began looking for flight schools in the United States via the Internet.

• In March 2000, Atta sent e-mails to flight schools in Florida and Oklahoma asking about pilot training. (S/ [redacted] NF)

#### First Group of Saudis Arrive in the United States

While the Hamburg pilots were wrapping up their business in Afghanistan and returning to Germany, halfway around the world in Malaysia, the al-Qa'ida veterans, Nawaf al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar, were also preparing to come to the United States. After receiving US visas in April, both men had traveled to Afghanistan and received special training in the

Los Angeles, California, and took up residency in San Diego. (S/ [redacted] NF)

Within several months of entering the United States, the two inquired about flight training in Florida, according to law enforcement information and court documents. In May 2000, they took two flight familiarization trips from a school in San Diego, however, they never signed up for formal flight training similar to the course of instruction that the hijacker-pilots seemed to have taken. Soon after these flights, the two split up—with al-Mihdhar leaving the country in June 2000 not to return for more than a year and al-Hazmi remaining in San Diego for the rest of the year.

• Al-Hazmi did little that was operationally significant for the rest of 2000; he eventually took a part-time job in a gas station from a local jihadist contact, according to law enforcement information.

• Al-Hazmi remained in the San Diego area until December 2000, when he met up with Hanjur—the hijacker who later piloted American Airlines flight 77 that crashed into the Pentagon—and the two paired up and moved to Phoenix, Arizona, where Hanjur brushed up or stayed current on his flying skills. (S/ [redacted] NF) (b)(3) NatSecAct

#### Pilot Training

Al-Shehhi, Atta, and Jarrah entered the United States in May and June 2000 from three different European cities. On 29 May, al-Shehhi flew from Brussels to Newark. Atta traveled by bus to Prague, entering the city on 2 June 2000, and flew to Newark the next day. Jarrah flew from Dusseldorf to Newark, and then on to Venice, Florida, on 27 June. (S/ [redacted] NF) (b)(3) NatSecAct

The three Hamburg pilots spent the latter half of 2000 learning to fly in Florida. After briefly touring the Airman Flight School in Oklahoma in early July 2000, Atta and al-Shehhi trained at Huffman Aviation, with a brief unsuccessful stint at nearby Jones Aviation, while Jarrah enrolled alone at the Florida Flight Training Center. It appears, however, that Jarrah was also to have had a Hamburg partner in Florida.

• Al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar entered the United States on 15 January 2000 from Bangkok, Thailand, via Hong Kong. They entered the United States through

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**Southeast Asia Meetings Advance  
al-Qa'ida Operation**

In early January 2000, al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi met in Kuala Lumpur with USS Cole suspect Tawfiq bin al-Attash (a.k.a. Khallad) and Abdul Shorabi al-Suhail.

- The Kuala Lumpur meetings were held in an apartment belonging to Malaysian extremist Yazid Sufaat, [REDACTED]

- Iraqi national and suspected al-Qa'ida operative Ahmad Hikmat Shakir al-Azzawi met al-Mihdhar and possibly others at the airport, where he had served as a ground staff employee assisting Arab travelers since 1999. (b)(3) NatSecAct

- The January 2000 meetings followed the failed millennium attacks in the United States and Jordan and the aborted attack on the USS The Sullivans in Yemen. (S) [REDACTED] (NS)

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On 8 January, al-Mihdhar, al-Hazmi, and Khallad traveled to Bangkok, Thailand. Al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi stayed in Bangkok until they left for Los Angeles on 15 January. We have no reporting on what al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi did during their stay in Bangkok.

- According to FBI debriefings of arrested USS Cole bombing suspect Fahd al-Quso, while in Bangkok, Khallad met with him and fellow USS Cole suspect Ibrahim al-Nibras. Al-Quso and al-Nibras had arrived from Yemen apparently to give Khallad \$36,000. By al-Quso's account, he and al-Nibras did not meet al-Mihdhar or al-Hazmi and left Bangkok on 18 January.

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There has been some speculation that al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi may have been involved in the preparation of a separate terrorist operation on US soil in 2000, before they became involved in the 11 September operation. (b)(1)

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Khallad, whom Al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi had met in Kuala Lumpur, is the suspected architect of the attack on the USS Cole. (S) [REDACTED] (NS)

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11 September

- Bin al-Shibh sent a deposit to the Florida Flight Training Center but failed on multiple occasions in 2000 to obtain a US visa. Zakaria Essabar, a member of the Hamburg cell and key associate of pilots Atta, al-Shehhi, and Jarrah, also tried and failed to obtain a visa in January 2001. He, too, was trying to reach Florida and even made a reservation at a Miami hotel before his visa application was rejected. Neither was turned down because he was believed to be a terrorist, but rather for fear he would not leave the United States after his visa expired. ~~(S)~~ (b)(3) NatSecAct

Atta and al-Shehhi remained paired up during early 2001, settling for a time in Georgia where they practiced their flying skills and traveled twice—in February and early April—to the Norfolk-Virginia Beach area for an undetermined reason.

- Once they had settled in Florida and opened a joint bank account, Atta and al-Shehhi began receiving substantial funds—more than \$100,000—to pay for their training and living expenses. These funds originated in the UAE—a key financial hub for the operation—and came into the United States either directly from the UAE or were funneled through Atta's and al-Shehhi's Hamburg associates Bin al-Shibh and Motassadeq. ~~(S)~~ (b)(3) NatSecAct

## 2001: The Plot Gathers Steam ~~(S)~~ ~~NOFORN~~

### Fourth Pilot Arrives

As 2000 drew to a close, the Hamburg pilots completed the crucial first stage of their mission: they received their pilot licenses and gained experience on jet simulators. At the same time, Hanjur—who had already obtained a pilot license in April 1999—entered the United States in early December, paired up with Nawaf al-Hazmi, and began jet training in Arizona.

- At the end of March 2001, the two drove cross country and eventually met up with other hijackers connected to 11 September. ~~(S)~~ (b)(3) NatSecAct

### Pilots Travel Abroad

All three of the Hamburg pilots traveled outside the United States in 2001 and probably conducted the

majority of the operational meetings with overseas operatives (see appendix C for a timeline of hijackers' travel outside the United States).

- On 3 January 2001, Atta flew from Tampa, Florida, to Berlin via Madrid, Spain, to meet with Bin al-Shibh. Atta told Bin al-Shibh during this meeting that the three pilots had finished initial flight training, obtained their pilot's licenses, and were awaiting further instructions from Bin Ladin. Atta asked Bin al-Shibh to travel to Afghanistan to receive these instructions. On 10 January, Atta returned to the United States, flying from Madrid to Miami.

- Jarrah traveled extensively in the early part of 2001, for both personal—visiting his wife in Germany—as well as operational reasons. Jarrah left the United States six times, apparently spending most of his time outside the United States in Lebanon or Germany.

- Al-Shehhi also traveled outside the United States, flying to the UAE, Germany, Morocco, and Egypt on three different trips. While it is known that al-Shehhi visited Atta's father during his April 2001 trip to Egypt to collect Atta's international driver's license, nothing else is known of al-Shehhi's activities while traveling outside the United States. ~~(S)~~ ~~NOFORN~~ (b)(3) NatSecAct

### Second Wave Arrives

The "second wave," which would support the pilots on 11 September, began to enter the country in late April 2001.

- After leaving Afghanistan, these hijackers spent approximately a week in the UAE, presumably to receive final instructions and funds, before entering the United States through Florida, Northern Virginia, and New York City.
- These hijackers all arrived in the United States in pairs or groups of three; either with members of their own flight team or members from another flight team. ~~(S)~~ ~~NOFORN~~

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**Alleged Travel to Prague (C//NF)**

Although we cannot rule it out, we are increasingly skeptical that Muhammad Atta met with Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) officer Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani in Prague in April 2001. We have received conflicting reports that allege that Atta traveled to Prague and met with al-Ani, but we have not been able to verify or refute these claims.

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Various reports put Atta in Prague on at least four occasions between late 1994 and the spring of 2001, but we can confirm only two of these trips—in December 1994 and June 2000. ~~(S//NF)~~

Atta arrived at the Prague airport on 19 December 1994, checked into a transit hotel, and departed the Czech Republic the next day.

We do not know the purpose of the trip and have no information about whom he met.

- This may have been a leg on his travel to Syria. According to press reporting, Atta and a German student made a second research trip to Syria at the end of 1994.

Atta arrived in Prague by bus from Germany at 0615 local time on 2 June 2000.

and he purchased an airline ticket for cash and departed Prague at 1140 hours on 3 June 2000

- Ramzi Bin al-Shibh, who claims he was very close to Atta, said that Atta traveled to the United States from Prague to conceal where his travel originated. Atta stayed for one night only in a Prague hotel and left for the United States the next day without meeting with anyone.

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The other

9 April 2001. The data surrounding

these visits is complicated and sometimes contradictory. A CIA and FBI review of intelligence and open-source reporting leads us to question the information provided by the Czech service source that claimed that Atta met al-Ani. ~~(S//NF)~~

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al-Ani

was away in Brno, at least a 90-minute drive from Prague, on 9 April 2001.

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**Hiding in "Plain View"**

The Saudi second wave hijackers spent less than five months in the United States before the 11 September attacks. During this time, they kept a low profile and maintained a "Westernized" appearance—they had shaved off their beards before coming to the United States and wore Western dress—to fit into society. They shared residences, bank accounts, and debit and credit cards. The young Saudi hijackers settled in Florida and New Jersey and, for the most part, traveled little during their time in the United States. The majority lived with other members of their flight teams.

- The only exceptions were Ahmad al-Ghamdi and 'Abd al-Aziz al-Umari who lived with American Airlines flight 77 hijackers in New Jersey until mid-August when they moved down to Florida to join their flight teams.
- According to law enforcement data, Suqami and Wa'il al-Shehri tried to visit the Bahamas in May 2001 but were denied entry because they did not have the proper papers with them.

- In late July, Walid al-Shehri traveled first class to San Francisco. (b)(3) NatSecAct

The last nonpilot hijacker to enter the country was al-Mihdhar, who returned to the United States on 4 July 2001 after spending nearly a year traveling between Yemen and Afghanistan. (b)(3) NatSecAct

- On 13 June, al-Mihdhar obtained a US visa in Jiddah. He spent the following month at the home of (b)(3) NatSecAct during which he told the operative that Bin Ladin was planning attacks on the United States.

- Al-Mihdhar apparently knew at this point that he was embarking on a suicide mission: before leaving Saudi Arabia on 3 July, he asked (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct to look after his wife and daughter in Yemen. (b)(3) NatSecAct

**Final Preparations (C/NF)**

Beginning in mid-2001, the four pilots for the 11 September attacks and Nawaf al-Hazmi made six visits to Las Vegas, Nevada, possibly as dry-run flights from the East to the West Coast on the same model of aircraft they would hijack on 11 September. These, and other domestic airline travel, also allowed the hijackers to study security procedures in a variety of US airports.

- The hijackers traveled to and from Las Vegas—generally on connecting flights that sometimes included transcontinental legs—giving them ample opportunity to assess several key aspects of the hijack plan. (S/NF)

(b)(3) NatSecAct Atta traveled to Madrid, Spain, on 8 July 2001. He rent (b)(1) on 9 July while still in Madrid. (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct

- On 19 July 2001, Atta returned to Madrid and flew back to Atlanta, then on to Fort Lauderdale. (b)(3) NatSecAct

In a September 2002 interview with al-Jazirah television, KSM and Bin al-Shibh said that, in July 2001, Atta and Bin al-Shibh met in Spain to "finalize the details" of the operation, agreeing that Atta would have control over the final choice of targets and the timing of the attacks.

- During this trip, Atta told Bin al-Shibh that the planning for the three targets was complete—Hanjur (Pentagon), Jarrah (Congress), and Atta and al-Shehhi (World Trade Center). Atta said the pilots had volunteered for their targets. He also said that al-Hazmi and Hanjur had flown reconnaissance flights near the Pentagon. (S/NF)

The terms used were academic: the Pentagon was the faculty of fine arts, the World Trade Center was the faculty of architecture, and the US Capitol—allegedly the target of Flight 93 that crashed in Pennsylvania—

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was the faculty of law. KSM claimed to al-Jazirah that the idea of striking the White House had been dropped for "navigation reasons."

- (b)(1) • KSM, who has been detained since March 2003,  
 (b)(3) CIAAct said he provided a list of several potential targets to  
 (b)(3) NatSecActta, and the White House was included in this list.

[redacted] KSM supervised the "final touches" of the 11 September operation.  
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- (b)(1) Atta relayed the date to Bin al-Shibh by phone on  
 (b)(3) CIAAct 29 August 2001 but in veiled language. Bin al-Shibh  
 (b)(3) NatSecAct [redacted] he passed the information to KSM who  
 conveyed the message to Bin Ladin. [redacted]

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During the first week of September 2001, the hijackers began to consolidate in the northeast, leaving their Florida residences, and to return unused operational funds to al-Qa'ida. Atta, al-Shehhi, Walid al-Shehri, and Fayiz Banihammad wired a total of \$26,000 back to the UAE from 6 to 10 September, while al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi apparently tried to send back more than \$10,000. They opened a bank account with unused funds and addressed a package containing the account's bankcard and PIN to a UAE post office box, but the package did not leave the United States before 11 September. (b)(3) NatSecAct

By 10 September, the hijackers were in the cities from which they would depart the following morning. The only exception to the pattern was Atta and fellow flight 11 hijacker al-Umari, who drove from Boston to Portland, Maine, on the afternoon of 10 September. Their known activities in Portland appear innocuous—visiting ATMs, a gas station, and Wal-Mart—and the trip may have been an effort to

follow al-Qa'ida guidance on having operatives enter the site of an attack separately. The next morning, they took an early connecting flight to Boston and boarded flight 11. (S//NF)

### Keys to Success (U)

Important factors—that are still relevant and difficult to fully mitigate—led to the success of the 11 September hijackers. (C/NF)

### Shrewd Selection of Operatives

With the exception of Nawaf al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar, who had been actively involved with al-Qa'ida since the mid-1990s, the men sent into the United States were expected to have little trouble entering the country on the basis of their nationality and "clean" records. Even Bin al-Shibh and Essabar in Hamburg were turned down on suspicion that they would not leave the United States after entering, not because of suspected terrorist links.

- Without existing derogatory information on the individuals involved, it will be extremely difficult to identify suspicious individuals among the millions who enter the United States every year. [redacted]

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The four pilots—who would have to spend the most time in the United States—also had the advantage of years of experience in and out of Western countries where they became familiar with banking, communication, and travel practices. KSM said in an al-Jazirah television interview that one of the first "problems" for the plotters was to "select suitable people who were familiar with the West." (C/NF)

### Relatively Safe Operating Environment

The planners of the 11 September attacks evidently felt comfortable enough with their assessment of US society—open, mobile, and diverse—that they could leave crucial operatives in place for more than a year without fear of discovery. Although pilot training is available in other countries, they chose to train their

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pilots for months inside the United States itself. The patient, long-term nature of the planning—roughly three years in all—allowed for careful assessment of the operating environment inside the United States before the hijackers entered and for the operatives themselves to conduct an unhurried study of US airport and airline practices once they were here. ~~(S//NF)~~

#### **Flexibility and Mission Focus**

The plotters encountered problems when Nawaf al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar were unable to undertake pilot training and Hamburg network member Bin al-Shibh was unable to enter the country for training, but they quickly readjusted. Al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar went on to act as support hijackers, Hanjur brought the number of qualified pilots up to four, and Bin al-Shibh changed roles—becoming an apparent financial and communications intermediary between the plotters in the United States and those in Afghanistan. ~~(S//NF)~~

#### **Well-Coached and Coordinated Financial Operations**

The transactions that supported the plot dovetailed with the cover stories and clean records of the conspirators and generally bore the mark of having learned from al-Qa'ida's long experience in moving funds unobtrusively. In using the international financial system, the plotters gave indication of their awareness of procedural requirements and reporting regulations, often taking obvious pains to be in compliance. They relied on their appearance of legitimacy and conducted a multitude of relatively minor transactions that—absent additional incriminating evidence—did not arouse suspicion. ~~(S//NF)~~

#### **Continuing Collection and Analytic Efforts (U)**

We continue to have several large gaps in our understanding of the 11 September plot. Continuing collection and analysis could fill in some of these gaps and help us to understand the larger picture of how al-Qa'ida plans and prepares its operations. We

#### **Financing the 11 September Plot (U)**

Key characteristics of the financial support for the 11 September operation include:

- **Long-Term Planning.** Transfers of significant funds related to the operation began nearly two years before the attacks and appear to have been calculated to cover specific training and travel needs.
- **Division of Labor.** Each hijacker appears to have been responsible for maintaining his own account and personal transactions, while three hijackers generally assumed responsibility for communicating with financial facilitators, receiving funds, and distributing them to other hijackers.
- **Pervasive Use of Cash.** The plotters used cash to open accounts and effectively concealed their day-to-day activities through cash withdrawals rather than check or credit transactions.
- **Trickle-Down Via Intermediaries.** The plotters obscured the operation's ultimate funding sources by sending funds through various individuals before reaching the final recipient.
- **Exploitation of Open Economies.** The operation's principal financial hubs were the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Germany, and the United States, partly because of the relative ease and anonymity with which financial transactions can be conducted in these countries. ~~(S//NF)~~

are working with foreign liaison services and other US Government agencies to address several key questions:

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**US Still Viable al-Qa'ida  
Operating Base (S//NF)**(b)(1)  
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Security measures since 11 September have created a tougher operational environment for al-Qa'ida. Nevertheless, recent reporting from detainees suggests al-Qa'ida

and may still view the United States as a relatively safe operational venue for its next wave of attacks.

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• KSM said that, since the 11 September operation, finding non-Arab passport holders was a priority for al-Qa'ida as its leadership thought it would be difficult for Middle Eastern passport holders to operate freely after the attacks. KSM noted that operatives were to carry French, Canadian, Malaysian, or Indonesian passports.

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• The large multicultural communities in the United States that allowed the 11 September hijackers to operate unseen for up to 18 months still offer al-Qa'ida operatives a convenient, ethnically diverse backdrop, while large pools of transient housing allow them to acquire short-term rentals that normally require less stringent background checks. Cultural and commercial considerations, especially in tourist areas, have fostered a climate of tolerance and respect for personal privacy.

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Open-source information that reviews the effectiveness of enhanced security measures in the United States is available to al-Qa'ida and other extremists and is likely to foster the belief that some US sites continue to be relatively safe operational venues. Open-source information that is available also allows terrorist operatives to look for ways to circumvent current security practices.

• KSM said that he was amazed at what he learned in the US media about the security changes since the 11 September attacks and that weaknesses could be identified by studying what the media reported. ~~(S//NF)~~

• How frequently and in what venues the hijackers coordinated with outside supporters on key decisions—such as target and date selection—after their arrival in the United States?

• What support network, witting or unwitting of the plot, assisted the hijackers within the United States?

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The Plot and the Plotters ■ ■ ■ ■

## Appendix A

### The 11 September 2001 Hijackers: Diverse Paths to Terrorism ~~(C//NF)~~

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## The 11 September 2001 Hijackers: Diverse Paths to Terrorism ~~(C//NF)~~

### Introduction (U)

The 19 terrorists whom Usama Bin Ladin chose to hijack and crash four planes into US buildings on 11 September 2001 came from diverse backgrounds and were almost complete unknowns from an intelligence and law enforcement perspective until the day of the attacks. Since that time, we have sorted through a bevy of information to pull together a clearer, but still incomplete, picture of the individual histories of these 19 young men and how they carried out this attack.

- Of the 19 hijackers, 15 were born in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, two in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), one in Lebanon, and one in Egypt (see map in appendix B with birthplaces of the hijackers). The high numbers of Saudi nationals among this group was almost certainly intentional and probably fulfilled operational as well as al-Qa'ida symbolic objectives.
- The hijackers' ages ranged from 20 to 33—but age does not seem to be a key factor in determining their role or participation in the plot. ~~(C//NF)~~

Although it is not clear what motivated all of them to become martyrs, individual differences among the hijackers' personal histories, family situations, and levels of devotion to Islam suggest that no single factor was determinative to their recruitment to al-Qa'ida. Information from a variety of sources suggests that several were adrift or had significant family conflicts, but not all.

- Economic circumstances among the 19 varied greatly, according to media reports, but several came from well-off families.

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some 11 September hijackers

were attracted to the

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extremist cause primarily because of personal and family considerations rather than deeply ingrained religious beliefs. ~~(S//NF)~~

### The Hijacker Network ~~(C//NF)~~

The 19 hijackers reflect four distinct subgroupings based on characteristics such as the length of their involvement with extremism, how and where they were recruited, their level of involvement and role in the plot, and when they entered the United States.

- **The early extremists: Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar**, the first two hijackers to enter the United States in an operational capacity, were born in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and had been close friends and involved with extremists since the mid-1990s.
- **The pilots from Hamburg: Muhammad Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi, and Ziad Jarrah**—three of the four hijacker-pilots on 11 September—were non-Saudi Arabs who lived in Germany for between four and eight years and probably became involved with Islamic extremists while there.
- **The 12 young Saudis:** More notable for their numbers and nationality than any specific skills, this grouping that we colloquially refer to as the "second wave" came to the United States about a year after the first two groups.
- **The two anomalies:** Saudi national **Hani Hanjour**, the fourth pilot, came to the United States after the first five. Emirate national **Fayiz Banihammad**, a hijacker who played a financial role, was one of the last hijackers to arrive in the United States.

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### The Early Extremists ~~(C//NF)~~

Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar, who entered the United States together on 15 January 2000, were from Saudi Arabia. Unlike several of the other

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hijackers who were from the southwestern provinces, these two were born and raised in Mecca—

Born one year apart, the two had become friends in middle school, according to family members. Reports differ about whether they both completed middle school, but neither appeared to have studied at any university.

- Al-Mihdhar had four brothers and two sisters; al-Hazmi had at least one younger brother Salim, who later became involved in the plot.

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#### From Devout Muslims to Extremists

Al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar attended their local mosques regularly in Saudi Arabia, but the two did not appear to be religious zealots.

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#### Recruitment For Jihad: A First Step to al-Qa'ida

For these two hijackers, recruitment into al-Qa'ida probably started with recruitment into the international mujahidin network. In contrast to the other Saudi hijackers who signed up for jihad much later, these two Saudis formed militant jihadist connections in the early-to-mid 1990s.

- Al-Hazmi first traveled to Afghanistan in 1993 when he was 17 years old. Al-Hazmi's father reportedly followed him and forced him to return to Saudi Arabia, even taking away his passport in an unsuccessful effort to prevent him from engaging such activities.

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- A year later after he returned to Saudi al-Hazmi

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same year al-Mihdhar dropped out of school to pursue extremist activities, possibly recruited by al-Hazmi or one of his contacts.

- In 1995, al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar went to Bosnia and Herzegovina and fought alongside foreign mujahidin against the Serbs. The two men subsequently strengthened their connections to al-Qa'ida by separately swearing loyalty to Bin Ladin perhaps as early as 1996 and in 1998, respectively.

- By the end of 1998, the two were well integrated into a Saudi al-Qa'ida network

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#### The Pilots From Hamburg

Muhammad Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi, and Ziad Jarrah lived in Hamburg, Germany—a port city of some 1.7 million people including 80,000 Muslims—before coming to the United States in May

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and June 2000. They were from Egypt, UAE, and Lebanon, respectively. By comparison to the rest of the hijackers, they were better educated, came from more "cosmopolitan" families, were themselves well traveled, and were on average older. The three also shared similar personal circumstances, coming from upper-middle-class backgrounds with fathers or families who pushed them to further their education.

find another place to live because his strict Islamic beliefs made them uncomfortable.

- Jarrah's family and press reports claim that Jarrah drank alcohol, partied, and did not hold any extreme religious beliefs before leaving for Germany. However [REDACTED]

information he was extremely religious and his activities had been contentious with [REDACTED]

(b)(1) [REDACTED]  
(b)(3) CIAAct  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

#### Pursuit of Higher Education

The three came to Germany independently and in different years but each ostensibly to gain more education. Atta, the first of the three to come to Germany, entered in 1992 when he was 24, spurred by his father to obtain a Western graduate degree. While Atta earned respectable grades and obtained a bachelor's degree from Cairo University in architectural engineering, they were not sufficient to secure him a spot in the graduate program at Cairo University.

- Atta originally applied to the architecture program at the School of Applied Science in Hamburg but was told the program was full. He was admitted after filing a complaint but withdrew when he was granted admission to the Technical University of Hamburg-Harburg.

- Unlike al-Shehhi and Jarrah, Atta was a serious student, attended classes regularly, and eventually succeeded in obtaining a degree—the equivalent of a master's degree—in urban planning in 1999.

~~(C//NF)~~

(b)(3) NatSecAct

- Jarrah, like Atta, was one of three siblings and the only son [REDACTED]

(b)(1) [REDACTED]

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

sent to the best, most expensive Christian schools in Beirut—chosen for educational not religious reasons. ~~(S//NF)~~

#### Religious Transformation Over Time

The degree to which they practiced or accepted their faith varied among the three and changed over time. Al-Shehhi, whose father was an imam or prayer leader in the local mosque, was considered very devout by his neighbors.

- Reports vary about how strict Atta's religious observance was before arriving in Germany. In Germany, Atta attended a mosque daily, according to press reports. The first family he lived with in Germany told the press that it had to ask Atta to

Al-Shehhi also came to Germany to study. After high school, al-Shehhi joined the military—a common path among members of his tribe that are heavily represented in the military and police forces—and earned a scholarship to study in Germany. In April 1996, he came to Germany at age 18 and settled in Bonn and took German language classes, a prerequisite before registering to study at a German university. He received a monthly stipend from the Emirate Government as part of his scholarship to study in Germany. ~~(C//NF)~~

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

Jarrah first came to Griefswald, a city in the former East Germany, in 1996 at age 21 with his cousin [redacted]. There he began to study aeronautical and flight engineering. It was also in Griefswald that he established a long-term romantic relationship with Aysel Sengun [redacted].

• By fall 1997, Jarrah moved to Hamburg. Unlike Atta and al-Shehhi, Jarrah attended the School of Applied Sciences in Hamburg, Germany. (S//NF)

#### Recruited for al-Qa'ida From Europe

In a marked difference from the rest of the hijackers, who appear to have been recruited in their home countries, Atta, al-Shehhi, and Jarrah may have been recruited in Germany. A common acquaintance of members of Atta's circle was German-Syrian Muhammad Heydar Zammar [redacted].

[redacted] and claims he persuaded them to travel to Afghanistan in 1998 to join jihad.

[redacted] (b)(3) CIAAct  
Mohamedou Ould Sla [redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted] convinced Atta, al-Shehhi, Jarrah, and Bin al-Shibh to undergo al-Qa'ida basic military training in Afghanistan. (b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted] three hijacker-pilots to travel to Afghanistan [redacted]

[redacted] the actual travel did not take place until late 1999. It is possible that the three hijacker-pilots had traveled earlier to Afghanistan, [redacted]

[redacted] More contact with al-Qa'ida in Afghanistan would bolster al-Qa'ida's confidence toward entrusting this operation to these individuals.

• In mid-1998, both Atta and al-Shehhi transferred general power of attorney over their individual

German bank accounts to other individuals [redacted]

[redacted] heightened security because of the East African US Embassy bombings in August 1998 may have delayed their travel.

• In addition, al-Shehhi reportedly obtained [redacted] passport [redacted]

[redacted] (b)(1)  
that al-Shehhi and Jarrah may have been connected to extremists [redacted] before coming to Germany. (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct

#### The Young Saudis to (NF)

The 12 Saudi hijackers who came to the United States in spring 2001 served to fill out the four hijackers [redacted]

[redacted] come from a variety of family backgrounds and have various educational levels—although few had moved beyond the equivalent of a high school education. (b)(3) NatSecAct

They appear to have joined the plot at a later stage than the pilots, and most, but not all, have personal histories that would suggest their ties to extremists did not go back more than two or three years. [redacted]

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1) [REDACTED]  
(b)(3) CIAAct  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

They had several older brothers who were successful businessmen or officers in the Saudi armed forces.

#### The Four Ghamdis

Ahmad al-Ghamdi, Sa'id al-Ghamdi, Hamza al-Ghamdi, and Ahmad al-Haznawi all hail from a cluster of three towns in or near the Al Bahah region of Saudi Arabia, an isolated and underdeveloped

All four share the same tribal affiliation—a strong social identifier in Saudi Arabia—and belong to the al-Ghamdi tribe that numbers some 200,000 in Saudi Arabia. The four were practically the same age—each born in 1979 or 1980—and none completed a university degree.

Sa'id left home in October 1999 to continue his university studies in al-Qassim but two months later and said he was going to jihad in Chechnya.

• During a post-11 September investigation by the Saudis, the brother of al-Haznawi recognized a photo of the father of Hamza al-Ghamdi suggesting at least some family interaction among the group before 11 September.

• Based on travel patterns and information from relatives, we believe the four were in contact with each other by the fall of 1999.

#### The Five From 'Asir

Wa'il and Walid al-Shehri, Ahmad al-Nami, Muhannad al-Shehri, and 'Abd al-Aziz al-Umari all hail from the Saudi Arabian 'Asir Province—a large, fairly poor region in the southwest, sometimes characterized as "the wild frontier"—that borders Yemen. In contrast to the four al-Ghamdis, the five from 'Asir had started university studies.

• Wa'il al-Shehri completed a course of study and started teaching Physical Education in Abha in 1999. ~~(C/NF)~~

Wa'il and his younger brother Walid al-Shehri came from a well-off family of 20 children, according to an interview their father gave to the US media.

Wa'il suffered from depression and asked for a leave of absence from his job to travel for treatment in April or May 2000. Walid dropped out of university and accompanied him to Jiddah. ~~(C/NF)~~

Ahmad al-Nami—the oldest of 10 siblings, according to an interview his father gave to US media—reportedly was the imam in his local mosque in Abha. He had trained at King Khaled University Islamic law school in Abha.

• According to al-Nami's father, by spring 2000, his son had withdrawn from the university and told his family he was traveling to Mecca to conduct the minor hajj and to look for work. He contacted his family five months later for the last time.

~~(C/NF)~~

Probably in 1997, Muhannad al-Shehri began his studies at the Imam Muhammad Ibn Saud Islamic University's branch in Abha and studied in Riyadh for a short time but returned to the university in Abha after failing his exams in Riyadh. He had six brothers.

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(b)(3) CIAAct  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

'Abd al-Aziz al-Umari studied in Oman during his middle school years, graduated with honors from high school, and, after he graduated from the Imam University, married

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**The Remaining Three**

**Salim al-Hazmi**, born in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, was the younger brother of Nawaf al-Hazmi.

Al-Hazmi family members have said that Salim was a quarrelsome teenager and created problems for his family because of excessive drinking and petty theft.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

**Uthman al-Suqami** (a.k.a. Satam Suqami) from Riyadh and **Majid Muqid** (a.k.a. Majid 'Awfi)—from a small town Annakhil west of Medina—had no known connections with any of the other hijackers or each other before becoming involved with extremists by 1999.

- According to press, Muqid was the son of a local village elder. Friends have reported to the Saudi press that he was known for his desire to join a jihad and that he had a relative who took part in the 1979 storming of Mecca's Grand Mosque.

he had dropped out of the university in late 2000/early 2001 after traveling to Bahrain.

- Al-Suqami reportedly worked in al-Taif as a security guard for a hospital. Al-Suqami had very little education and reportedly was involved in drinking alcohol and perhaps drugs. During the last few years he had become introverted and withdrawn from his family and friends—frequently disappearing from home for periods of time.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

**Path to Religious Extremism**

All of the young Saudis' families maintain that their sons were not religious zealots. Interviews with families portrayed some of the hijackers as devout while others appeared lacking in their faith.

- Despite their early exposure to Islam, according to Mabathith interviews with the hijackers' families, al-Suqami and Salim al-Hazmi were unconcerned with religion and contrary to Islamic law drank alcohol. According to Salim's father, however, three months before he left home, after being released from jail, Salim began attending the mosque regularly and quit drinking.

- The three al-Ghamdi's were devout Muslims who attended prayer services regularly, according to their families. Al-Umari was described as a conservative and devoutly religious young man who often served as an imam for his mosque.

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

al-Haznawi's

came cl(b)(3) NatSecAct as a religious extremist, leaning toward a "strict/severe viewpoint and expressing a desire to participate in the jihad in Chechnya."

al-Nami had begun to exhibit signs of extremism in 1997 when he grew a beard and stopped watching television.

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(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

**Recruitment Similar to Two Early Extremists**

The majority of the Saudi second wave hijackers began to break contact with their families in late 1999 and into 2000. While several of them evinced interest in ongoing jihads—especially the conflict in Chechnya, according to information from family and friends—few probably fought anywhere other than in Afghanistan, given the shortness of time and difficulty getting to Chechnya. However, in many cases it is difficult to verify whether such statements about travel are true or just cover stories.

- The four al-Ghamdis were probably 19 or younger when they went off for jihad; each told their families that he was going to Chechnya.

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(b)(3) CIAAct

only two hijackers—Ahma (b)(3) NatSecAct

al-Ghamdi and Sa'id al-Ghamdi—have documentation suggesting travel to a Russian republic; it is possible that they were trying to get to Chechnya.<sup>2</sup>

(b)(1)

- Salim al-Hazmi did spend some time in A(b)(3) CIAAct fighting against the Northern Alliance. (b)(3) NatSecAct

<sup>2</sup> In 1999, Ibn al-Khattab—the primary commander of Arab nationals in Chechnya—began turning away most foreign-born, Afghanistan-trained mujahidin because of their lack of operational experience and their inability to adjust to the region's terrain and climate or to speak local dialects.

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The hijackers came into contact with individuals who may have put them onto the path toward jihad and ultimately al-Qa'ida through personal contacts in Saudi Arabia or at places such as universities or mosques. For example, one of these Saudis, 'Abd al-Aziz al-Umari, was a student of radical cleric Sulayman al-Alwan. Moderate cleric (b)(1) al-Alwan's mosque in al-Qassim Province, (b)(3) NatSecAct factory, (b)(3) NatSecAct

• Sa'id al-Ghamdi and Muhannad al-Shehri lost contact with their families shortly before expressing a desire to travel to or having spent time in al-Qassim Province.

• In addition, some Western media reports claim that al-Haznawi may have had a hand in the recruitment of Hamza al-Ghamdi and Ahmad al-Ghamdi, a claim we cannot fully corroborate.

• Al-Nami may have recruited Walid and subsequently his older brother Wa'il into the jihadist movement. After returning from a government religious camp in 1999, al-Nami had become very religious. According to press reports, in the spring of 2000 al-Nami, the al-Shehri brothers and Sa'id al-Ghamdi gathered in a local mosque to pray and meditate in an informal ceremony that bound them to jihad and, if necessary, to die in the defense of Islam.

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**Two Anomalies (S//NF)****Hani Hanjur—A Different Path**

Hani Hanjur shares commonalities with all three subgroupings of hijackers—his jihadist ties go back as far as a decade, he was the plot's fourth pilot, and

he was a Saudi national. He was born in At-Taif in 1972, the third of four brothers in a fairly well-to-do family. His eldest brother has been head of the household since the death of Hanjur's father.

• We do not have information about when or where Hanjur was recruited, but it may have been as early as 1989 when as a 17 year old he left Saudi Arabia to fight against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Because the Soviets were withdrawing from Afghanistan at this time, Hanjur claims he spent most of his time working with the al-Ighatha Relief Agency—Muhannad al-Shehhi may also have worked with this agency—arranging for the transfer of goods from Peshawar, Pakistan, to Kabul Afghanistan.

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• Unlike the other hijackers, Hanjur (b)(3) CIAAct United States—Florida, California (b)(3) NatSecAct before the plot was organized (b)(3) NatSecAct

Hanjur traveled to the United States for the first time in 1991 hoping that learning English would assist him in becoming a pilot. Family members say he returned that same year "a different man" supporting militant Islam.

• During the next few years, he finished his secondary education, but despite achieving fairly respectable scores on his final high school exams, he was denied entrance into the Civil Aviation School in Jiddah—a longtime dream, according to press reports.

• His second attempt to attend the Civil Aviation School a few years later also ended in failure—even after a second trip to the United States in 1996 to take some pilot training.

• In 1997, on probably his third trip to the United States, Hanjur traveled to Phoenix, Arizona, to again study English and take more pilot training, finally earning his private pilot's license in April 1998 and a commercial pilot's license in April 1999. He returned home in April 1999. (S//NF)

shortly after his return from the United States in 1999, Hanjur left home to reportedly take a job in the UAE as a pilot. It is possible that he was in a training camp in Afghanistan

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during this time

- He returned home just once afterward in September 2000. During this time he applied for and received a new US visa. His fourth and last trip to the United States occurred in December.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

**Who is Fayiz Banihammad?**

We have limited information on Fayiz Rashid Banihammad and little understanding of his family or personal history. He was born in 1977 in the port city of Khawr Fakkan in Sharjah Emirate, UAE.

he was married to a Syrian national and had

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

**Conclusions About the 11 September Hijackers (U)**

*In our view, the hijackers were carefully selected with an eye to their operational and political value.*

For instance, the large number of Saudi nationals was most likely chosen not only because of the ease with which Saudi nationals could get US visas but also because Bin Ladin could send a message to the Saudi Royal family that he had deep support from the southwestern tribes for his jihad against the United States, according to press reports.

- Saudi nationals, especially from the southwest region, played a prominent role in several past al-Qa'ida terrorist attacks against the United States, including the USS Cole bombing in October 2000 and the US Embassy bombings in 1998.
- One-quarter of the plotters for the 11 September attacks were recruited from the 'Asir region—an area traditionally known for extremist activities and the region where Bin Ladin grew up. (C/NE)

*Personal connections and family ties among the hijackers stand out as important to forming the 11 September hijacker network.* Among the 19 were two sets of brothers—Walid and Wa'il al-Shehri and Nawaf and Salim al-Hazmi—and other subgroupings in which individuals may have known each other for years before the plot. (C/NE)

*It is not clear what motivated all of them to become martyrs, and no single "root cause" seems to underpin their actions.* Although most of the Saudis tended to turn toward jihad during or near the end of their high school years, not all fit this pattern. Rather, the preconditions for recruitment—both for jihad and later for al-Qa'ida—appear to stem from multiple causes including, but not limited to, deteriorating or difficult family relationships, overly high or low personal expectations, or a need for personal fulfillment.

- Several did appear to have fairly significant conflicts—or feel extreme pressure—from their fathers or father substitutes, according to media

- Although most attended mosques regularly, few stood out from the others as religious extremists from an early age. Each individual seemed to undergo a personal experience or meet an individual that steered them down the extremist path.

- Obviously, the 19 shared a commitment to al-Qa'ida and a hatred of the United States. The underlying reasons for the hatred of the United States are probably not the same in each case.

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As their extremist sympathies deepened, all tended to undergo changes noticeable to their families, including the expression of radical ideology and of the dictates of their religion, such as eliminating alcohol or growing a beard.

- Some of the hijackers had family members attempt to moderate their views or behaviors to no avail.

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

- Within a year or two before coming to the United States, almost all of the hijackers seemed to have become estranged from their families. ~~(S//NF)~~

*This plot marks the first time al-Qa'ida has used Arabs living in Europe as martyrs, although there have been European Arabs in al-Qa'ida for years.*

- The Hamburg pilots lived in the West, spoke English, and knew the Western way of life and were able to study in the United States. ~~(S//NF)~~

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their young ages limits the amount of time they have been involved in jihad, it is very possible that these young men had been extremists long before the 11 September plot was approved

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The Plot and the Plotters ■ ■ ■ ■

## Appendix B

### Hijackers' Profiles (U)

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
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11  
September

## Birthplaces of 11 September Terrorists (U)



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
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## HIJACKER PROFILE

11 September

**Muhammad al-Amir Awad al-Sayed Atta**

## Aliases/variants

(b)(1)  
(b)(3) CIAAct  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

## Nationality

Egyptian

## Date of birth

1 September 1968

## Place of birth

Kafr el-Sheikh, Egypt

## Age

33 years

## Gender

Male

## Hair color

Brown

## Eye color

Brown

## Height

5' 7"-8"

## Weight

153 lbs.

## Marital status

Single

(b)(1)

## Role

Suspected Pilot AA flight 11

(b)(3) CIAAct

## Passports

(b)(3) NatSecAct

## Other documentation

Florida driver's license #A300-540-68-321-0,  
issued 2 May 2001.  
FAA commercial pilot's license #2638890.

## Visa information

US B1/B2 visa control no. 20001389580003,  
issued 18 May 2000, Berlin, Germany, expires 16 May 2005

## Education

Degrees from Cairo University, Hamburg-Harburg Technical  
University in architectural engineering, urban planning

## Family information

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

Muhammad Atta, an Egyptian national born in Kafr el-Sheikh, Egypt, in 1968, was the pilot-hijacker onboard American Airlines flight 11. Atta was the only son and youngest of three siblings. His family seems to have stressed personal and professional achievement—his father is a lawyer.

At the insistence of his father he traveled to Germany to pursue his studies. (U)

Atta lived in Hamburg, Germany, from 1992 to 2000 receiving a degree in urban planning in 1999. After an apparent trip to Afghanistan in December 1999-February 2000, he entered the United States in June 2000 and spent the rest of the year in flight training with flight 175 pilot-hijacker Marwan al-Shehhi. Atta traveled both abroad and domestically before traveling to Boston and Portland, Maine, immediately preceding the 11 September attacks.

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(b)(3) CIAAct

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## HIJACKER PROFILES



'Abd al-Aziz 'Abd al-Rahman Muhammad (b)(1) mari

Aliases/variants (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct

Nationality Saudi

Date of birth 28 May 1979

Place of birth al Awran, Saudi Arabia

Age 22 years

Gender Male

Hair color Brown

Eye color Black

Height 5' 4"

Weight No data available

Marital status Married (b)(1)

Role Suspected hijacker AA flight 11 (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct

Passports

Other documentation International driver's license IADC-OI0726217, issued 27 July 2001. Virginia ID, issued 2 August 2001, Customer # listed as A69600385.

Visa information US visa control no. 20011690590010, issued 18 June 2001, Jiddah, Saudi Arabia (b)(1)

Education Graduated Imam University (b)(3) CIAAct

Family information (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1) 'Abd al-Aziz al-Umari, a Saudi national born on 28 May 1979 in al (b)(1), Saudi Arabia, was one of the last two participants in the 11 September plot to al

(b)(3) CIAAct States, rounding out the total complement at 19. (b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1) In June/July 2000, he traveled to the al-Qassim area with the (b)(3) CIAAct goal of obtaining a degree from the university. (b)(1) he (b)(1) ave traveled (b)(3) NatSecAct to Chechnya because he had talked about his desire to go there. (b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) CIAAct confirm that he was in Afghanistan for most of the fall of 2000. (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct Al-Umari entered the United States on a B1/B2 visa on 29 June 2001, flying from Dubai to London and then on to New York City aboard the same flight as American Airlines flight 77 hijacker Salim al-Hazmi. He resided in New Jersey until early August when he moved to Florida to join his flight team. It is still unclear why al-Umari and Atta traveled to Portland, Maine, the evening preceding the 11 September attacks. (S) (b)(3) NatSecAct

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
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## HIJACKER PROFILES



## Uthman bin Muhammad 'Abd al-Rahman al-Suqami

## Aliases/variants

(b)(1)  
(b)(3) CIAAct  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

## Nationality

Saudi

## Date of birth

28 June 1976

## Place of birth

Riyadh, Saudi Arabia

## Age

25 years

## Gender

Male

## Hair color

Black

## Eye color

Brown

## Height

5'7"

## Weight

No data available

## Marital status

Single

(b)(1)  
(b)(3) CIAAct

## Role

Suspected hijacker AA flight 11

(b)(3) NatSecAct

## Passports

## Other documentation

No data available

## Visa information

B1/B2 US visa, visa control no. 20003267080004, issued 21 November 2000, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia

## Education

Attended Royal Faculty (engineering)

(b)(1)

## Family information

(b)(3) CIAAct  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

Uthman al-Suqami (a.k.a. Satam Suqami) was a Saudi national born on (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct  
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. According to Saudi authorities, Suqami came from (b)(3) NatSecAct  
none of whose members had much education. Before his recruitment by (b)(3) NatSecAct

held an unskilled job as a security guard and may have had a drinking problem. (b)(1)  
in 1999 Suqami and Majid Muqid (American Airlines flight 77 hijacker)  
reportedly traveled to and spent time in a training camp in Afghanistan. (b)(3) NatSecAct

Suqami arrived in the United States on 23 April 2001 together with fellow AA flight 11  
hijacker Walid al-Shehri. Information from another US Government agency indicates that  
Suqami lived in Florida after his arrival in the United States and held a joint bank account  
with Walid al-Shehri. There is little other reporting on Suqami to suggest that he contributed  
much besides muscle to the mix of skills of the 11 September plotters. (b)(3) NatSecAct

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**Wa'il Muhammad 'Abdallah al-Shehri**

Aliases/variants	(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct
Nationality	Saudi
Date of birth	31 July 1973
Place of birth	Khamis Mushayt, Saudi Arabia
Age	28 years
Gender	Male
Hair color	Black
Eye color	Brown
Height	5' 10"
Weight	No data available
Marital status	Single (b)(1)
Role	Suspected hijacker AA flight 11 (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct
Passports	
Other documentation	Florida driver's license A426-880-76-001-0 (CLASS E)
Visa information	B1/B2 US visa, issued 24 October 2000, Jiddah
Education	Teaching degree (b)(1)
Family information	(b)(3) CIAAct Brother: Walid Muhammad Abdallah al-Shehri (b)(3) NatSecAct

Wa'il al-Shehri was a Saudi national born in Khamis Mushayt, Saudi Arabia, on 31 July 1973. He came from a large, prosperous family—13 brothers and 6 sisters. After receiving his teaching certificate, he worked as a teacher in a nearby school. According to his family, in mid-2000, after suffering from depression, Wa'il asked for leave of absence from his job. Al-Shehri and his younger brother, AA flight 11 hijacker Walid al-Shehri, supposedly traveled to Jiddah. They returned home for a short time in fall 2000. They left home in November 2000 without telling their family where they were going—they reportedly spent time in a training camp in Afghanistan. (b)(3) NatSecAct

Al-Shehri entered the United States on 8 June 2001 along with Ahmad al-Haznawi (United Airlines flight 93 hijacker) and resided in Florida until he and Walid flew to Boston on 5 September. (b)(3) NatSecAct

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TOP SECRET

NOFORN

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

TOP SECRET




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(b)(3) NatSecAct

## HIJACKER PROFILES

**Walid Muhammad 'Abdallah al-Shehri**

Full name	Walid Muhammad 'Abdallah al-Shehri
Aliases/variants	(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct
Nationality	Saudi
Date of birth	20 December 1978
Place of birth	Khamis Mushayt, Saudi Arabia
Age	22 years
Gender	Male
Hair color	Black
Eye color	Brown
Height	5' 8"
Weight	No data available
Marital status	Single (b)(1)
Role	Suspected hijacker AA flight 11 (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct
Passports	
Other documentation	Florida driver's license -A42689378460, issued 4 May 2001, duplicate issued 5 May 2001. International driver's license permit #179581, issued 5 June 01, UAE.
Visa information	B/1-B/2 US visa control no. 20002982510003, issued 24 October 2000, Jiddah, Saudi Arabia
Education	Second-year student at a teacher's college in probably Abha, Saudi Arabia; dropped out and never completed studies
Family information	(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct Brother: Wa'il Muhammad 'Abdallah al-(b)(3) NatSecAct

Walid al-Shehri, a Saudi national born in Khamis Mushayt, Saudi Arabia, on 20 December 1978, was one of five hijackers on American Airlines flight 11. He came from a large, prosperous family—13 brothers and 6 sisters. He studied at a teachers college until he dropped out to accompany his brother on an extended trip to Jiddah in mid-2000. They returned home for a short time in fall 2000. They left home in November 2000 without telling their family where they were going—they reportedly spent time in a training camp in Afghanistan. (S) (b)(3) NatSecAct

Al-Shehri entered the United States in late April 2001 with American Airlines flight 11 hijacker Satam al-Suqami. While in the United States, al-Shehri flew to—but did not enter—the Bahamas and later flew from Florida to San Francisco and back the next day. He and Wa'il flew to Boston on 5 September. (S) (b)(3) NatSecAct

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~~SECRET~~

NOFORN

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) CIAAct

~~TOP SECRET~~

NOFORN//X-1

(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~TOP SECRET~~~~NOFORN//X1~~

(b)(3) NatSecAct



## Marwan Yousef Muhammad Rashid Lekrab al-Shehhi



## Aliases/variants

(b)(1)  
(b)(3) CIAAct  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

## Nationality

Emirate

## Date of birth

9 May 1978

## Place of birth

Ras al-Khaymah, United Arab Emirates

## Age

23 years

## Gender

Male

## Hair color

Black

## Eye color

Brown

## Height

5' 8"

## Weight

228

## Marital status

Married

(b)(1)

## Role

Suspected pilot UA flight 175

(b)(3) CIAAct

## Passports

(b)(3) NatSecAct

## Other documentation

Florida driver's license A420-540-78-169-0 issued 12 April 2001, replacement issued 19 June 2001.  
Commercial pilot's license 002636862 first issued from FAA Southern Region 21 December 2000, replacement issued 19 June 2001.

## VISA information

10-year B1/B2 multiple-entry visa issued 18 January 2000, US Consulate Dubai, UAE

## Education

Studied electrical engineering at Technical University in Germany

Studied German at university in Bonn

(b)(1)

## Family

## information

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

Marwan al-Shehhi, an Emirate national, was born on 9 May 1978 in Ras al-Khaymah, UAE. He joined the United Arab Emirates military after completing high school. In spring 1996, al-Shehhi traveled to Germany on a military scholarship to study at the Goethe Institute in Bonn. After the Goethe Institute, al-Shehhi continued his studies in Hamburg where he flunked out. Sometime during his stay in Hamburg, al-Shehhi became acquainted with Muhammad Atta and moved into 54 Marienstrasse, an apartment located in a lower-middle-class neighborhood in Hamburg. It was also during this period that al-Shehhi spent time in an al-Qa'ida training camp in Afghanistan. (S) (b)(3) NatSecAct

Al-Shehhi arrived in the United States on 29 May 2000. Al-Shehhi and Atta attended flight training in Florida from July-December 2000. Al-Shehhi made at least two trips outside the United States after first arriving from Germany on 27 May 2000. Al-Shehhi appears to have handled much of the logistics and some of the financing for the hijackers. He is the suspected pilot of United Airlines flight 175 that crashed into the south tower of the World Trade Center. (S) (b)(3) NatSecAct

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~~SECRET~~~~NOFORN~~

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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~~TOP SECRET~~

(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~NOFORN//X1~~

## HIJACKER PROFILES

**Fayiz Rashid Ahmad Hassan al-Qadi Banihammad****Aliases/variants**(b)(1)  
(b)(3) CIAAct  
(b)(3) NatSecAct**Nationality**

Emirate

**Date of birth**

19 March 1977

**Place of birth**

Khorfakkan, United Arab Emirates

**Age**

24 years

**Gender**

Male

**Hair color**

Black

**Eye color**

Brown

**Height**

5' 10"

**Weight**

No data available

**Marital status**

Married w/child (nfi)

**Role**

Suspected hijacker UA flight 175

(b)(1)  
(b)(3) CIAAct  
(b)(3) NatSecAct**Passports****Other documentation**Florida driver's license F200-060-77-099-0.  
International driver's license #32199.**Visa information**US visa control 20011694710006, foil # 45915108,  
issued 18 June 2001**Education**

Unknown

(b)(1)  
(b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) CIAAct**Family information**

(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct

Fayiz Banihammad (a.k.a. Fayiz Ahmad) was an Emirate national born 19 March 1977 in Khorfakkan, UAE.

Banihammad was the last of the hijackers to train in the Afghanistan camps. (b)(3) NatSecAct

Part of the second wave of hijackers, he entered the United States on 27 June 2001 with United Airlines flight 93 hijacker Sa'id al-Ghamdi. According to information provided by another government agency, Banihammad lived with Marwan al-Shehhi in Florida until their flight team moved into place in Boston in early September 2001. Banihammad appears to have played a significant financial role in the 11 September attack (b)(3) NatSecAct

40

~~SECRET~~~~NOFORN~~

(b)(3) CIAAct


(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~TOP SECRET~~~~NOFORN//X4~~

(b)(3) NatSecAct



## Ahmad Salih Sa'id al-Kurshi al-Ghamdi



### Aliases/variants

(b)(1)  
(b)(3) CIAAct  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

### Nationality

Saudi

### Date of birth

2 July 1979

### Place of birth

Alamarassa, Saudi Arabia

### Age

22 years

### Gender

Male

### Hair color

Black

### Eye color

Brown

### Height

5' 6"

### Weight

130-150 lbs.

### Marital status

Single

### Role

Suspected hijacker UA flight 175

### Passports

### Other documentation

USAID card 3403401372-C

### Visa information

B-1/B-2 visa

### Education

Completed high school; graduated from Health Community School as a nurse

### Family information

(b)(1)  
(b)(3) CIAAct  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

Ahmad al-Ghamdi (a.k.a. Ahmad al-Kushi) a Saudi national, was born on 2 July 1979 in Alamarassa, Saudi Arabia. He left home in 1998-99 supposedly for Chechnya. He returned and left a final time in September 2000 after obtaining a US visa. He arrived in the United States from Dubai, UAE, via Lond (b)(3) NatSecAct American Airlines flight 77 hijacker, Majid 'Awfi. (S [redacted] NE)

There is some indication that he was travel coordinator for the group. Also, it was odd that he stayed in New Jersey with members of AA flight 77 when he arrived; he did not move to Florida until 9 August. He was one of six hijackers who received a fraudulent Virginia driver's license in August 2001. He also was one of the hijackers who recruited a Middle Eastern man from a 7-11 store in Falls Church to take Nawaf al-Hazmi, Hani Hanjur, Majid Muqid, and himself to Fairmont, Connecticut. He was a hijacker on United Airlines flight 175. (S [redacted] NE) (b)(3) NatSecAct

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~~SECRET~~~~NOFORN~~

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) CIAAct


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(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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NOFORN//X1

## HIJACKER PROFILES

**Hamza Salih Ahmad al-Hamid al-Ghamdi****Aliases/variants**

(b)(1)  
(b)(3) CIAAct  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

**Nationality**

Saudi

**Date of birth**

18 November 1980

**Place of birth**

Ajandam, Saudi Arabia

**Age**

20 years

**Gender**

Male

**Hair color**

Black

**Eye color**

Brown

**Height**

5' 7"

**Weight**

No data available

**Marital status**

Single

(b)(1)

**Role**

Suspected hijacker UA flight 175

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

**Passports****Other documentation**

Florida driver's license A425-337-80-418-0  
issued 2 July 2001.  
Florida ID A425.337.80.418.0 issued 26 June 2001.  
Florida learner license A425-337-80-418-0  
issued on 27 June 2001.  
Duplicate Florida driver's license A425-337-80-418-0  
issued 27 August 2001.

**Visa information**

Visa control 20002918210007, B2 visa

**Education**

Completed high school, applied/not (b)(1)ed to university

**Family information**

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

Hamza al-Ghamdi, a Saudi national, was born on 18 November 1980 in Ajandam, Saudi Arabia. Hamza received a US visa in October 2000 and left Saudi Arabia in November 2000. He arrived in the United States on 28 May 2001 from Dubai, UAE, via London with fellow United Airlines flight 175 hijacker Mahamid al-Shehri and United Airlines flight 93 hijacker Ahmad al Nami. (b)(3) NatSecAct

According to information from another government agency, al-Ghamdi resided in Florida with other hijackers until early September 2001 when he moved into place in Boston.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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SECRET

NOFORN

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

TOP SECRET

NOFORN//X1

(b)(3) NatSecAct



~~TOP SECRET~~~~NOFORN//X1~~

(b)(3) NatSecAct

## HIJACKER PROFILES

**Muhannad Fayiz al-Shehri****Aliases/variants**

(b)(1)  
(b)(3) CIAAct  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

**Nationality**

Saudi

**Date of birth**

7 May 1979

**Place of birth**

Tanumah, Saudi Arabia

**Age**

22 years

**Gender**

Male

**Hair color**

Black

**Eye color**

Brown

**Height**

5' 7"

**Weight**

No data available

**Marital status**

Single

(b)(1)  
(b)(3) CIAAct

**Role**

Suspected hijacker UA flight 175

(b)(3) NatSecAct

**Passports****Other documentation**

Florida State ID Card #A426-540-79-167-0,  
issued 2 July 2001.

**Visa information**

Visa control no. #20002979630009,  
issued 23 October 2000, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia

**Education**

Dropped out of university in Abha, Saudi Arabia; briefly  
attended a university in Riyad (b)(1)

**Family****information**

(b)(3) CIAAct  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

Muhannad al-Shehri (a.k.a. Mohand al-Shehri), a Saudi national, was born on 7 May 1979 in Tanumah, Saudi Arabia. al-Shehri had entered Abha University after graduating from secondary school but soon left to go to a university in Riyadh. His father asked him to return to Abha University after he failed his exams in Riyadh. (b)(3) NatSecAct

Al-Shehri left home in late 1999. When he contacted his family in early 2000, he told them he was in a refugee camp in Ingushetia and would be home soon. However, although he kept in contact with his family until Spring 2001, he never returned home. He received a US visa in October 2001 and left Saudi Arabia in November 2000. (b)(3) NatSecAct

He arrived in the United States from Dubai, UAE, via London on 28 May 2001 along with United Airlines flight 175 hijacker Hamza al Ghamdi and United Airlines flight 93 hijacker Ahmad al Nami. (b)(3) NatSecAct

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~~SECRET~~~~NOFORN~~

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) CIAAct


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(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

## HIJACKER PROFILES

**Ziad Samir Jarrah**

Aliases/variants	(b)(1)
Nationality	Lebanese (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct
Date of birth	11 May 1975
Place of birth	Al-Marj, Lebanon
Age	26 years
Gender	Male
Hair color	Blonde
Eye color	Green
Height	5' 10"
Weight	174 lbs. (b)(1)
Marital status	Married (b)(3) CIAAct
Role	Pilot, UA flight 93 (b)(3) NatSecAct
Passports	

**Other documentation** Florida driver's license #J600997751710, issued 2 May 2001, expiration 11 May 2007.  
Virginia ID #T6619335, issued 29 August 2001, expires 31 May 2005.  
FAA private pilot certification #2633773.  
International Student ID Card (UNESCO): S-049-207-976-467.

**Visa information** US visa #34138882, issued 3 September 2000, in Beirut

**Education** Graduated Hikmeh High School (Christian school in Beirut).  
Attended university in Germany.

**Family information** (b)(1)  
(b)(3) CIAAct  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

Ziad Jarrah, a Lebanese national born on 11 May 1975 in Al-Marj, Lebanon, was the pilot for the hijack team that took over United Airlines flight 93. Jarrah was the only son of a government worker. He had two sisters. His father sent him to the best Christian schools in Beirut. ~~(C/NE)~~

When he was 21 years old, Jarrah moved to Germany to continue his studies. He lived first in the eastern city of Greifswald and then moved to Hamburg where he met fellow hijackers Muhammad Atta and Marwan al-Shehhi. Information from a variety of sources indicates that Jarrah was radicalized in Germany and then went to Pakistan and Afghanistan from late November 1999 through late January 2000. ~~(S)~~ ~~(NF)~~ (b)(3) NatSecAct

Jarrah entered the United States on a B1/B2 visa for the first time on 27 June 2000, flying from Dusseldorf to Newark and then on to Atlanta and Venice, Florida. He traveled outside the United States six times after that to the Bahamas, Europe, and the Middle East. He obtained pilot certification after studying at a flight school in Florida during 2000-01. ~~(S)~~ ~~(NF)~~

44

~~SECRET~~~~NOFORN~~

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) CIAAct

~~TOP SECRET~~~~NOFORN//X1~~

(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~TOP SECRET~~~~NOFORN//X1~~

(b)(3) NatSecAct

**Ahmad 'Abdallah Ahmad al-Nami**

Aliases/variants

(b)(1)

Nationality

Saudi

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

Date of birth

7 December 1977

Place of birth

Abha, Saudi Arabia

Age

23 years

Gender

Male

Hair color

Black

Eye color

Brown

Height

5' 5"

Weight

No data available

Marital status

Single

Role

Suspected hijacker UA flight 93

Passports

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

Other

documentation

Visa information

US visa #39731764, issued 28 October 2000,  
in Jiddah, Saudi Arabia.US visa #43139969, issued 23 April 2001,  
in Jiddah, Saudi Arabia.

(b)(1)

Education

Dropped out of university in Abha, Saudi Ara

(b)(3) CIAAct

Family

information

(b)(3) NatSecAct

Ahmad al-Nami, a Saudi national born on 7 December 1977 in Abha, Saudi Arabia, was one of the four members of the United Airlines flight 93 hijack team. Al-Nami was the oldest of 10 children and an imam at his mosque. (S) (b)(3) NatSecAct

Information from a variety of sources indicates that al-Nami was radicalized in Saudi Arabia during 1999-2000, dropping out of sight by the late spring of 2000.

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

al-Nami traveled to Beirut and then on to Tehra (b)(3) NatSecAct hijackers Walid and Wail al-Shehri in November 2000—a customary route for al-Qa'ida members going to Afghanistan. (S) (b)(3) NatSecAct

Al-Nami entered the United States on a B1/B2 visa on 28 May 2001, flying from Dubai to London and then on to Miami aboard the same flight as hijackers Mohand al-Shehri and Hamza al-Ghamdi. According to information from another government agency, al-Nami resided in Florida until September 2001 when he moved into place in Newark, New Jersey. (S) (b)(3) NatSecAct

45

~~SECRET~~~~NOFORN~~

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) CIAAct

~~TOP SECRET~~~~NOFORN//X1~~

(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~TOP SECRET~~~~NOFORN//X1~~

(b)(3) NatSecAct

## HIJACKER PROFILES

**Ahmad Ibrahim Ali al-Haznawi****Aliases/variants**

(b)(1)  
(b)(3) CIAAct  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

**Nationality**

Saudi

**Date of birth**

11 October 1980

**Place of birth**

Baljorashi, Saudi Arabia

**Age**

20 years

**Gender**

Male

**Hair color**

Black

**Eye color**

Brown

**Height**

No data available

**Weight**

No data available

**Marital status**

Single

**Role**

Suspected hijacker UA flight 93

**Passports**

(b)(1)  
(b)(3) CIAAct  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

**Other documentation****Visa information**

US visa #39731493, issued 12 November 2000, in Jiddah, Saudi Arabia

**Education**

Attended an engineering university; dr(b)(1)ut

**Family information**

(b)(3) CIAAct  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)  
(b)(3) CIAAct  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

Ahmad al-Haznawi, a Saudi national born in Baljorashi, Saudi Arabia, on 11 October 1980, was one of the four hijackers of United Airlines flight 93. According to his father, Ahmad al-Haznawi had a strict viewpoint and expressed a desire to participate in the jihad in Chechnya. [redacted] information from various sources suggests that, in the two years before his arrival in the United States, al-Haznawi traveled to Kuwait, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Syria, and the United Arab Emirates. (S) NF (b)(3) NatSecAct

On 8 June 2001, al-Haznawi entered the United States with a B1/B2 visa, arriving in Miami, Florida, from the UAE, via London, England. He arrived with fellow hijacker Wa'il al-Shehri. He resided in Florida until early September 2001 when he moved to a hotel in New Jersey. (S) NF (b)(3) NatSecAct

46

~~TOP SECRET~~~~NOFORN~~

(b)(3) NatSecAct




(b)(3) CIAAct

~~TOP SECRET~~~~NOFORN//X1~~

(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~NOFORN//X1~~

(b)(3) NatSecAct

HIJACKER PROFILES	
	<b>Sa'id 'Abdallah Ali Salman al-Ghamdi</b>
	Aliases/variants (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct
	Nationality Saudi
	Date of birth 21 November 1979
	Place of birth Baljorashi, Saudi Arabia
	Age 21 years
	Gender Male
	Hair color Black
	Eye color Brown
	Height 5' 6"
	Weight No data available
	Marital status Single (b)(1)
	Role Suspected hijacker UA flight 93 (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct
	Passports
	Other documentation Florida driver's license
	Visa information US visa #39737298, issued 3 April 2000, in Jiddah, Saudi Arabia. US visa #43146043, issued 12 June 2001, in Jiddah, Saudi Arabia. (b)(1)
	Education Imam University School of Religious Study; Ur (b)(3) CIAAct Qasim (b)(3) NatSecAct
	Family information (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct
	Sa'id al-Ghamdi, a Saudi national born in Baljurshi, Saudi Arabia, on 21 November 1979, was one of the four hijackers of United Airlines flight 93. Sa'id al-Ghamdi contacted his family around December 1999 to say that he had left for jihad in Chechnya. Information from various sources suggests that in the two years before his arrival in the United States, al-Ghamdi traveled to Moldova, Bahrain, Lebanon, Qatar, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the United Arab Emirates. (b)(3) NatSecAct
	On 27 June 2001, al-Ghamdi entered the United States with a B1/B2 visa, arriving in Orlando, Florida, from the UAE, via London, England, along with United Airlines flight 175 hijacker Fayiz Banihammad. Sa'id remained in Florida until early September when he moved to a hotel in New Jersey. (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)  
(b)(3) CIAAct  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~SECRET~~ ~~NOFORN~~  
(b)(3) NatSecAct


(b)(3) CIAAct

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~TOP SECRET~~~~NOFORN//X4~~

(b)(3) NatSecAct



## Hani Salih Hasan Hanjur



### Aliases/variants

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

### Nationality

Saudi

### Date of birth

30 August 1972

### Place of birth

Ta'if, Saudi Arabia

### Age

29 years

### Gender

Male

### Hair color

Black

### Eye color

Brown

### Height

5' 8"

### Weight

168 lbs.

(b)(1)

### Marital status

Single

(b)(3) CIAAct

### Role

Pilot, AA flight 77

(b)(3) NatSecAct

### Passports

### Other documentation

International/Saudi Arabia drivers license #190311 1016769372.

Commercial pilot certificate, 002576802, issued 15 April 1999.

Arizona driver's license #B11977869, issued on 29 November 1991.

Florida driver's license #H526-337-72-310-0, issued 15 April 1996.

Maryland ID card #H-526-298-757-675.

Virginia State nondriver's license #T66 (b)(1) 9, issued on 1 August 2001.

SSN: (b)(3) CIAAct

### Visa information

US visa #03901826609; issued in Jidda (b)(3) NatSecAct on 25 September 2000

### Education

Taif Secondary School, Taif, Saudi Arabia.

ELS Language Center, Oakland, Calif (b)(1)

### Family Information

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

Hani Hanjur, a Saudi national, was one of the five hijackers and suspected pilot of American Airlines flight 77. Hanjur was born on 30 August 1972, in the Saudi city of Ta'if. Hanjur was a graduate of the local high school, and (b)(1) when he was only 17 traveled to Afghanistan to take part in the jihad against the Soviet Army. In 1991, Hani traveled to Phoenix to study English. In 1992, Hanjur returned to Saudi Arabia and managed one of the Hanjur family's agricultural properties during the mid-1990s. (b)(3) NatSecAct

On 2 April 1996, Hanjur returned to the United States, and during his eight-month stay, he studied English and began flight training. He returned to Saudi Arabia on 29 November 1996, then returned to the United States after a year's absence and earned his commercial pilot's license in April 1999. Less than two weeks later, Hanjur left the United States. He obtained a new Saudi passport in Saudi Arabia in July 2000 and in December of that year, returned to the United States. During the next year, he spent time in Arizona, Virginia, Connecticut, New Jersey, Maryland, and Las Vegas with other hijackers and practiced his flying skills. (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) CIAAct

~~SECRET~~~~NOFORN~~

(b)(3) NatSecAct


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(b)(3) NatSecAct



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MUGSHOT PROFILE	
	
<b>Khalid Muhammad 'Abdullah al-Mihdhar</b>	
Aliases/variants	(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct
Nationality	Yemeni (Saudi after 1995)
Date of birth	5 May 1975
Place of birth	Mecca, Saudi Arabia
Age	26 years
Gender	Male
Hair color	Black
Eye color	Brown
Height	5'5"
Weight	No data available (b)(1)
Marital status	Married (b)(3) CIAAct
Role	Suspected hijacker AA flight 77 (b)(3) NatSecAct
Passports	
Other documentation	Virginia State nondrivers license ID #T66190718. California driver license #D24 I 6697, issued 5 April 2000. USA ID identification.
Visa information	B-1/B-2 multiple-entry visa issued at Jiddah, Saudi Arabia, on 13 June 2001, expires 12 June 2003. B-1/B-2 multiple-entry visa issued at Jiddah, Saudi Arabia, on 7 April 1999, expires 6 April 2000.
Education	Middle school, commercial secondary academy (dropped out)
Family information	(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct
<p>Khalid al-Mihdhar, a Saudi national, was one of the five hijackers of American Airlines flight 77. He was born in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, on 16 May 1975. He was married with a young child. In the mid-1990s, he and flight 77 hijacker Nawaf al-Hazmi joined other Arabs to fight in Bosnia as members of a mujahidin force led by a prominent al-Qa'ida operative. (b)(3) NatSecAct</p> <p>Al-Mihdhar obtained a US visa in Saudi Arabia in April 1999, and in January 2000, he and al-Hazmi traveled to Malaysia where he was observed meeting with a known al-Qa'ida operative, Khalid. Shortly thereafter, he and al-Hazmi arrived in the United States. Al-Mihdhar left the United States in June 2000 after briefly attempting flight training. He evidently traveled between Yemen, Afghanistan, and Saudi Arabia. He obtained another United States visa in Jiddah in June 2001 and returned to the United States the following month. During the next two months, he spent time in New York, New Jersey, Virginia, and Maryland. (b)(3) NatSecAct</p>	

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

## HIJACKER PROFILE

**Nawaf bin Muhammad Salim al-Hazmi**

<b>Aliases/variants</b>	(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct
<b>Nationality</b>	Saudi
<b>Date of birth</b>	9 August 1976
<b>Place of birth</b>	Mecca, Saudi Arabia
<b>Age</b>	25 years
<b>Gender</b>	Male
<b>Hair color</b>	Black
<b>Eye color</b>	Brown
<b>Height</b>	5' 5" - 5' 7"
<b>Weight</b>	140-150 lbs. (b)(1)
<b>Marital status</b>	Single (b)(3) CIAAct
<b>Role</b>	Suspected hijacker AA flight 77 (b)(3) NatSecAct
<b>Passports</b>	
<b>Other documentation</b>	INS#: 89473829607. California driver's license D2416698. Florida driver's license A425-633-76-288-0.
<b>VISA information</b>	B-1/B-2 multiple-entry visa issued at Jiddah, Saudi Arabia, on 3 April 1999, expires 2 April 2001, visa no. 14436338.
<b>Education</b>	Middle school (b)(1)
<b>Family information</b>	(b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Brother: Salim al-Hazmi

Nawaf al-Hazmi, a Saudi national, was one of the five hijackers of American Airlines flight 77. He was born in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, on 9 August 1976. According to Saudi authorities, al-Hazmi's father disapproved of his son's extremist activities and followed Nawaf to Afghanistan in 1993, forcing him to return to Saudi Arabia. In the mid-1990s, he and flight 77 hijacker Khalid al-Mihdhar fought in Bosnia. By 1998, al-Hazmi was well integrated into a Saudi al-Qa'ida network. He was issued a new Saudi passport in March 1999 and a US visa in April. In late 1999, he traveled again to Afghanistan, relocating to Pakistan by the end of the year. (b)(3) NatSecAct

Al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar flew to Malaysia in January 2000 where they were observed meeting with al-Qa'ida operative Walid Ba Attash (a.k.a. Khallad). The two men then flew to the United States where they resided in San Diego, California. Other than taking a couple of hours of flight lessons, it is not known what they were doing during their stay in California. (b)(3) NatSecAct

Al-Mihdhar left the United States for the latter half of 2000, and al-Hazmi remained in the San Diego area until December when he moved to Arizona with Hani Hanjur. In April 2001, al-Hazmi and flight 77 pilot Hani Hanjur left Arizona and eventually settled in New Jersey.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

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## HIJACKER PROFILES

**Salim Muhammad Salim al-Hazmi**

Aliases/variants	(b)(1)
Nationality	Saudi (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct
Date of birth	2 February 1981
Place of birth	Mecca, Saudi Arabia
Age	20 years
Gender	Male
Hair color	Black
Eye color	Brown
Height	5' 4"
Weight	148 lbs.
Marital status	Single (b)(1)
Role	Suspected hijacker AA flight 77 (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct
Passports	
Other documentation	Virginia State driver's license ID # A69-60-0408. USA ID #3408826-A, Apollo International Travel, NJ.
Visa information	US visa B-2, Admin# 96582215707, issued 4 April 1999, Jiddah, Saudi Arabia, expires 28 December 2001 (b)(1)
Education	Middle school (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct
Family information	Brother: Nawaf bin Muhammad Salim al-Hazmi

Salim al-Hazmi, a Saudi national, was one of the five hijackers of American Airlines flight 77 and the brother of fellow flight 77 hijacker Nawaf al-Hazmi. Salim was born in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, on 5 February 1981. A troublesome teenager, after being released from jail in the fall of 1999, he reportedly became very nervous, after which he left home and never returned. (S) (b)(3) NatSecAct

Between 1996 and late 1999, Salim traveled to Afghanistan at least once and fought with the Taliban against the Northern Alliance. In January 2000, Salim traveled to Yemen and probably returned to Afghanistan at some point during 2000. In June 2001, Salim received a new Saudi passport and a US visa and arrived in the United States on 29 June along with American Airlines flight 11 hijacker 'Abd al-Umari. They lived in New Jersey with several other hijackers and fraudulently obtained Virginia IDs in early August 2001. (S) (b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) CIAAct

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

## HIJACKER PROFILES

11 September

**Majid Muqid Mash'an bin Mawqid 'Awfi****Aliases/variants**(b)(1)  
(b)(3) CIAAct  
(b)(3) NatSecAct**Nationality**

Saudi

**Date of birth**

18 June 1977

**Place of birth**

Al-Nakhil, Saudi Arabia

**Age**

24 years

**Gender**

Male

**Hair color**

Black

**Eye color**

Brown

**Height**

5' 6"

**Weight**

120 lbs.

**Marital status**

Single

**Role**

Suspected hijacker AA flight 77

(b)(1)  
(b)(3) CIAAct  
(b)(3) NatSecAct**Passports****Other documentation**Virginia State nondriver's license ID #A69600405.  
USA ID card #3402618-D from Apollo International Travel, New Jersey.**Visa information**

US visa B2 01820353409

**Education**

Dropped out of university

**Family information**

Brother: Khalid Mash'an Mawqid

Majid Muqid (a.k.a. Majid 'Awfi), a Saudi national, was one of the five hijackers of American Airlines flight 77. He was born in al-Nakhil, Saudi Arabia, on 18 June 1977. He reportedly attended university until late 2000 when he quit and said he was going abroad. In November, he obtained a new Saudi passport and a US visa; he then may have traveled to Afghanistan along with American Airlines flight 11 hijacker Satam Saqami. (b)(3) NatSecAct

He arrived in the United States in May 2001 with United Airlines flight 175 hijacker Ahmad al-Ghamdi and settled in New Jersey. In August, he moved to Maryland and shared an apartment with Khalid al-Mihdhar until the 11 September attacks. (b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

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The Plot and the Plotters ■ ■ ■ ■

## Appendix C


### Timelines (U)

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

# Timeline of the Hijackers' Acquisition of US Visas (U)



## LEGEND

- American Airlines Flight 11
- American Airlines Flight 77
- United Airlines Flight 175
- United Airlines Flight 93

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(b)(3) NatSecAct




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(b)(3) CIAAct

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# Timeline of the Hijackers' Purchase of 11 September Airline Tickets<sup>a</sup> (U)



## LEGEND

American Airlines Flight 11  
American Airlines Flight 77  
United Airlines Flight 175  
United Airlines Flight 93

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11 September

# Key Events Leading to the 11 September 2001

(b)(3) CIAActs (C//NF)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

the 11 September attacks were conceived after Usama Bin Ladin's declared jihad against the United States in 1998. We have information that all 19 hijackers each spent time in Afghanistan camps during late 1999 and early 2001, presumably receiving general al-Qa'ida training.

The leadership cadre arrived in the United States in 2000 (colloquially referred to as the "first wave"). All of them had some pilot or flight training in the United States. The "second wave" of hijackers, probably responsible for controlling the passengers on the 11 September flights, entered the United States during the spring and summer of 2001. (S//NF) (b)(3) NatSecAct

## 2000

	Second wave of hijackers traveled to Iran and Pakistan during 2000, probably for onward travel to Afghanistan for training.
5-15 January	Al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi hold meetings with a senior UBL field operative in Malaysia and Bangkok.
15	Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi arrive in Los Angeles from Bangkok.
18	Marwan al-Shehhi receives US visa.
3 April	Sa'id al-Ghamdi receives US visa (receives another US visa on 12 June 2001 that he uses to travel to the United States).
May	Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi take flying lessons in San Diego.
17/25	Mohammad Atta and Ziad Jarrah receive US visas.
29	Al-Shehhi arrives in Newark from Belgium.
3 June	Atta arrives in Newark from Czech Republic. (Reportedly makes a few trips outside the United States between January and September 2001.)
10	Al-Mihdhar leaves the United States; does not return until 5 July 2001.
27	Jarrah arrives in Newark from Germany. (He travels between the United States and Europe six times between June and August 2000.)
July-September	Atta and al-Shehhi begin flight training at Huffman Aviation and Jones Flying Service.
September-November	Twelve of the second wave of hijackers receive US visas.
November-December	Atta purchases flight-deck videos for the Boeing 747 model 200, Boeing 757 Model 22, Boeing 767 Model 300ER, and the Airbus Model 200 and other items from a pilot store in Ohio.
8 December	Hani Hanjour arrives in Cincinnati from UAE (He had been entering and leaving the United States periodically since the early 1990s).
21	Atta and al-Shehhi receive their pilot licenses.

## 2001

23 April-29 June	The second wave of hijackers arrive in the United States throughout the eastern seaboard.
2 May	Atta receives Florida driver's license. (Many of the hijackers obtained US state driver's licenses or state IDs, presumably to make it easier to check in at the airport on 11 September.)
18-20 June	'Abd al-Aziz al-Umari, Fayiz Banihammad, and Salim al-Hazmi receive US visas.

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11 September

## Key Events Leading to the 11 September 2001 Attacks, continued (C//NF)

2001

14-16 August	Nawaf al-Hazmi, Hanjur, and Atta travel to Las Vegas during the same three-day period; al-Shehhi flew to Las Vegas in late May; and Jarrah flew to Las Vegas in late June. (All flew on aircraft similar to those used in the 11 September attacks.)
25-31	All of the hijackers buy tickets for 11 September. (b)(1)
(b)(1) 4 September	Atta sends a Fedex envelope from Kinko's Mail Center in Hol (b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) CIAAct	Almohtaran (translates to "the respected one") (b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct	
5	Hijackers residing in Florida begin to purchase tickets to Boston and Newark to position themselves for 11 September.
6	Atta cashes check for \$5,300 in South Pompano Beach, Florida.
	Satam Suqami, Wail al-Shehri, and Abd al-Aziz al-Umari arrive in Boston from Florida to position themselves for 11 September.
	Banihammad wires \$8,055 from his Florida Sun Trust account to his Standard Chartered bank account in UAE.
7	Hamza and Ahmad al-Ghamdi arrive in Boston from Florida.
	Atta arrives in Baltimore from Florida.
	Jarrah, al-Haznawi, al-Nami, and Sa'id al-Ghamdi arrive in Newark from Florida.
8	Atta wires \$2,860 and \$5,000 to "Mustafa Ahmed" in UAE.
	Fayiz Banihammad and Muhannad al-Shehri arrive in Boston from Florida.
(b)(1) 9	Al-Shehri wires \$5,000 to al-Husawi in Sharjah, UAE.
(b)(3) CIAAct	Marwan al-Shehhi arrives in Boston from Florida. (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct	Jarrah mails farewell package to Aysel Sengun, his wife. (b)(3) CIAAct
	(b)(3) NatSecAct
	Atta makes his last phone call to his father
	Atta travels from Baltimore to Boston.
10	Atta and al-Umari drive to Portland.
	Marwan al-Shehhi wires \$5,400 to "Mustafa Ahmad" in UAE.
	Nawaf al-Hamzi checks into Herndon hotel. (Most of flight AA 77 team already in general area [Laurel, MD].) (b)(1)
11	Ziad Jarrah phones father for last time. (b)(3) CIAAct
	wife for last time. (b)(3) NatSecAct
	Atta and al-Umari travel via Colgan Air to Boston.
	Atta receives a phone call from a payphone in Logan's terminal C, United, at 6:53 AM.
	A cell phone call lasting a few minutes is made between the hijack teams at Logan Airport.
	Atta uses a cellular phone immediately before boarding Flight 11 to call a number belonging to hijacker Shehri, among others.
	Attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon.

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) CIAAct


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## Timeline of the 11 September Hijackers First Entry to the US and Subsequent Travel Outside the US (1999-2001)

Flight AA 77 UA 175 AA 11 UA 93

First entry into US

<sup>a</sup> Travel to the United States before 11 September plot: 3 Oct 1991 (New York), 2 Apr 1996 (New York), 16 Nov 1997 (Atlanta).<sup>b</sup> Denied entry by Bahama authorities.

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The Plot and the Plotters

**Appendix D****Other Publications on the  
11 September Attacks (U)**

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**Other Publications on the 11 September Attacks (U)****Threat Threats: Most 11 September Plotters Still Unaccounted For 40/NFI; 18 January 2002\***

Most of the al-Qa'ida leaders and operatives who helped Bin Ladin plan and carry out the 11 September attacks remain unaccounted for. None of the high-level al-Qa'ida figures involved in planning and overseeing the implementation of the attacks has yet been arrested, although significant progress has been achieved around the world in detaining lower-level operatives and individuals who facilitated or had foreknowledge of the attacks. We anticipate that our knowledge about the plotters will continue to expand as the intelligence and law enforcement investigations continue. (TS//NF)

**Gauging the War on Terrorism: Most 11 September Terrorist Practices Still Viable TC/NFI; 30 January 2002\***

Analysis of the 11 September hijacker tradecraft suggests that the key requirements for such attacks remain readily available in the United States. The heightened security environment within the United States has rendered more difficult—though by no means impossible—future terrorist attacks within the United States exactly like those that occurred on 11 September.

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**Arizona: Long-Term Nexus for Islamic Extremists 40/NFI; 15 May 2002  
CTC 2002-30037H (joint paper with FBI)**

Loosely affiliated Islamic extremists in Arizona pose a credible threat, based on their violently anti-US views and ties to senior al-Qa'ida operatives. Besides becoming involved directly in operations, these militants would be well positioned to finance or aid the travel of other operatives less familiar

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with operating in the United States

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**Alternative View: Two 11 September Hijackers Possibly Involved in Previous US Plot ~~(C/NF)~~ 5 July 2002**  
**CTC-2002-30064**

Two of the 11 September hijackers, Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, may have been involved in the preparation of a terrorist operation on US soil in 2000, before they became involved in the 11 September operation.

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(b)(3) CIAAct

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(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

**Facilitating Disaster: An Overview of 11 September Finance (U); 22 August 2002**  
**CTC 2002-40093H**

The financial transactions that supported the 11 September attacks in many ways reflected the overall nature of the operation, relying on ostensibly legitimate activities carried out in the United States and Western Europe over the course of more than two years. The hijackers and their financial facilitators appear to have been well coached by an organizational leadership with lengthy experience in moving funds unobtrusively. In the pre-11 September atmosphere, the plotters' clean personal histories and close adherence to an unobtrusive system of financial interaction that supported the plot could not—absent additional cause for suspicion—have alerted US officials or financial-sector observers to the impending disaster. ~~(S/NF)~~

**Threat Threads: Recent Advances in Understanding 11 September ~~(C/NF)~~**  
**16 September 2002**  
**CTC 2002-30086CH**

An update of the January 2002 Threat Threads: Most 11 September Plotters Still Unaccounted For (C/NF), which provided our assessment of those involved in the conceptualization and execution of the 11 September attack and their whereabouts. In the past six months, we have uncovered new personalities involved in the plot—particularly Khalid Shaykh Muhammad—and have expanded our understanding of the role played by other facilitators, including individuals possibly in the United States. ~~(C/NF)~~

\*No publication number – numbering did not begin until March 2002.

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(b)(3) NatSecAct